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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Several distinct trends will influence space exploration missions in the next decade. Destinations are 
becoming more remote and mysterious, science questions more sophisticated, and, as mission experience 
accumulates, the most accessible targets are visited, advancing the knowledge frontier to more difficult, 
harsh, and inaccessible environments. This leads to new challenges including: hazardous conditions that 
limit mission lifetime, such as high radiation levels surrounding interesting destinations like Europa or 
toxic atmospheres of planetary bodies like Venus; unconstrained environments with navigation hazards, 
such as free-floating active small bodies; multielement missions required to answer more sophisticated 
questions, such as Mars Sample Return (MSR); and long-range missions, such as Kuiper belt exploration, 
that must survive equipment failures over the span of decades. These missions will need to be successful 
without a priori knowledge of the most efficient data collection techniques for optimum science return. 
Science objectives will have to be revised ‘on the fly’, with new data collection and navigation decisions 
on short timescales. 
Yet, even as science objectives are becoming more ambitious, several critical resources remain 
unchanged. Since physics imposes insurmountable light-time delays, anticipated improvements to the 
Deep Space Network (DSN) will only marginally improve the bandwidth and communications cadence to 
remote spacecraft. Fiscal resources are increasingly limited, resulting in fewer flagship missions, smaller 
spacecraft, and less subsystem redundancy. As missions visit more distant and formidable locations, the 
job of the operations team becomes more challenging, seemingly inconsistent with the trend of shrinking 
mission budgets for operations support. How can we continue to explore challenging new locations 
without increasing risk or system complexity? 
These challenges are present, to some degree, for the entire Decadal Survey mission portfolio, as 
documented in Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013–2022 (National Research 
Council, 2011), but are especially acute for the following mission examples, identified in our recently 
completed KISS Engineering Resilient Space Systems (ERSS) study:  
1. A Venus lander, designed to sample the atmosphere and surface of Venus, would have to perform 
science operations as components and subsystems degrade and fail;  
2. A Trojan asteroid tour spacecraft would spend significant time cruising to its ultimate destination 
(essentially hibernating to save on operations costs), then upon arrival, would have to act as its 
own surveyor, finding new objects and targets of opportunity as it approaches each asteroid, 
requiring response on short notice; and  
3. A MSR campaign would not only be required to perform fast reconnaissance over long distances 
on the surface of Mars, interact with an unknown physical surface, and handle degradations and 
faults, but would also contain multiple components (launch vehicle, cruise stage, entry and 
landing vehicle, surface rover, ascent vehicle, orbiting cache, and Earth return vehicle) that 
dramatically increase the need for resilience to failure across the complex system.  
The concept of resilience and its relevance and application in various domains was a focus during the 
study, with several definitions of resilience proposed and discussed. While there was substantial variation 
in the specifics, there was a common conceptual core that emerged—adaptation in the presence of 
changing circumstances. These changes were couched in various ways—anomalies, disruptions, 
discoveries—but they all ultimately had to do with changes in underlying assumptions. Invalid 
assumptions, whether due to unexpected changes in the environment, or an inadequate understanding of 
interactions within the system, may cause unexpected or unintended system behavior. A system is 
resilient if it continues to perform the intended functions in the presence of invalid assumptions.  
Our study focused on areas of resilience that we felt needed additional exploration and integration, 
namely system and software architectures and capabilities, and autonomy technologies. (While also an 
important consideration, resilience in hardware is being addressed in multiple other venues, including 
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other KISS studies.) The study consisted of two workshops, separated by a seven-month focused study 
period. The first workshop (Workshop #1) explored the ‘problem space’ as an organizing theme, and the 
second workshop (Workshop #2) explored the ‘solution space’. In each workshop, focused discussions 
and exercises were interspersed with presentations from participants and invited speakers. 
The study period between the two workshops was organized as part of the synthesis activity during the 
first workshop. The study participants, after spending the initial days of the first workshop discussing the 
nature of resilience and its impact on future science missions, decided to split into three focus groups, 
each with a particular thrust, to explore specific ideas further and develop material needed for the second 
workshop. The three focus groups and areas of exploration were: 
1. Reference missions: address/refine the resilience needs by exploring a set of reference missions 
2. Capability survey: collect, document, and assess current efforts to develop capabilities and 
technology that could be used to address the documented needs, both inside and outside NASA 
3. Architecture: analyze the impact of architecture on system resilience, and provide principles and 
guidance for architecting greater resilience in our future systems 
The key product of the second workshop was a set of capability roadmaps pertaining to the three 
reference missions selected for their representative coverage of the types of space missions envisioned for 
the future. From these three roadmaps, we have extracted several common capability patterns that would 
be appropriate targets for near-term technical development: one focused on graceful degradation of 
system functionality, a second focused on data understanding for science and engineering applications, 
and a third focused on hazard avoidance and environmental uncertainty. Continuing work is extending 
these roadmaps to identify candidate enablers of the capabilities from the following three categories: 
architecture solutions, technology solutions, and process solutions. 
The KISS study allowed a collection of diverse and engaged engineers, researchers, and scientists to think 
deeply about the theory, approaches, and technical issues involved in developing and applying resilience 
capabilities. The conclusions summarize the varied and disparate discussions that occurred during the 
study, and include new insights about the nature of the challenge and potential solutions: 
1. There is a clear and definitive need for more resilient space systems. During our study period, 
the key scientists/engineers we engaged to understand potential future missions confirmed the 
scientific and risk reduction value of greater resilience in the systems used to perform these 
missions.  
2. Resilience can be quantified in measurable terms—project cost, mission risk, and quality of 
science return. In order to consider resilience properly in the set of engineering trades performed 
during the design, integration, and operation of space systems, the benefits and costs of resilience 
need to be quantified. We believe, based on the work done during the study, that appropriate 
metrics to measure resilience must relate to risk, cost, and science quality/opportunity. Additional 
work is required to explicitly tie design decisions to these first-order concerns.  
3. There are many existing basic technologies that can be applied to engineering resilient space 
systems. Through the discussions during the study, we found many varied approaches and 
research that address the various facets of resilience, some within NASA, and many more 
beyond. Examples from civil architecture, Department of Defense (DoD) / Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiatives, ‘smart’ power grid control, cyber-physical 
systems, software architecture, and application of formal verification methods for software were 
identified and discussed. The variety and scope of related efforts is encouraging and presents 
many opportunities for collaboration and development, and we expect many collaborative 
proposals and joint research as a result of the study.  
4. Use of principled architectural approaches is key to managing complexity and integrating 
disparate technologies. The main challenge inherent in considering highly resilient space 
systems is that the increase in capability can result in an increase in complexity with all of the 
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risks and costs associated with more complex systems. What is needed is a better way of 
conceiving space systems that enables incorporation of capabilities without increasing 
complexity. We believe principled architecting approaches provide the needed means to convey a 
unified understanding of the system to primary stakeholders, thereby controlling complexity in 
the conception and development of resilient systems, and enabling the integration of disparate 
approaches and technologies. A representative architectural example is included in Appendix F. 
5. Developing trusted resilience capabilities will require a diverse yet strategically directed 
research program. Despite the interest in, and benefits of, deploying resilience space systems, to 
date, there has been a notable lack of meaningful demonstrated progress in systems capable of 
working in hazardous uncertain situations. The roadmaps completed during the study, and 
documented in this report, provide the basis for a real funded plan that considers the required 
fundamental work and evolution of needed capabilities. 
Exploring space is a challenging and difficult endeavor. Future space missions will require more 
resilience in order to perform the desired science in new environments under constraints of development 
and operations cost, acceptable risk, and communications delays. Development of space systems with 
resilient capabilities has the potential to expand the limits of possibility, revolutionizing space science by 
enabling as yet unforeseen missions and breakthrough science observations. 
Our KISS study provided an essential venue for the consideration of these challenges and goals. 
Additional work and future steps are needed to realize the potential of resilient systems—this study 
provided the necessary catalyst to begin this process.  
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2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The recent Planetary Science Decadal Survey (National Research Council, 2011) describes missions that 
have tremendously challenging requirements on resilience. The spacecraft that support these missions, 
and the next generation beyond them, must be capable of reasoning about their own state and the state of 
the environment in order to predict and avoid hazardous conditions, to recover from internal failures, and 
to ultimately meet critical science objectives in the presence of substantial uncertainties. Moving beyond 
the current state of the practice requires a fundamental paradigm shift in the way we conceptualize, 
design, implement, validate, and operate these systems. The challenge is to figure out a way to effectively 
develop, integrate, and deploy such reasoning capabilities in order to enable new classes of missions at an 
acceptable cost, without introducing real or perceived risk of mission failure. Our recently completed 
KISS study investigated the system capabilities, software architectures, and autonomy technologies that 
will be needed in order to address the anticipated resilience challenges posed by these future missions. 
The findings resulting from these investigations have set the stage to demonstrate key resilience concepts 
for future missions through appropriate prototypes. 
Many different concepts are related to idea of resilience, including, but not limited to, robustness, 
adaptability, flexibility, autonomy, fault tolerance, robustness, and operability. During the study, several 
definitions of resilience were proposed and discussed.1 While there was substantial variation in the 
specifics, there was a common conceptual core that emerged—adaptation in the presence of changing 
circumstances. These changes were couched in various ways—anomalies, disruptions, and discoveries—
but they all ultimately had to do with changing assumptions. All engineered systems, in order to function 
properly, are based on assumptions about the construction of the system and the environment in which the 
system is intended to work. These assumptions can be simple or complex, and are typically in regard to 
the environment (radiation levels, dust storms, temperatures) or the system (turning on a power switch 
results in a device being active, a device is or is not healthy, performing action X affects action Y in a 
particular way). Invalid assumptions, whether due to unexpected changes in the environment, or an 
inadequate understanding of interactions within the system, may cause unexpected or intended system 
behavior. A system is resilient if it continues to perform the intended functions in the presence of invalid 
assumptions. Resilience is a system characteristic or property that increases the robustness of these 
systems. If the set of assumptions is constant, complete, and unchanging, then no resilience is needed in a 
system. 
In the face of changed assumptions, adaptation of the system configuration and behavior may be required 
in order to meet the current set of system objectives. The set of alternatives available to a system is one 
measure of the resilience of a system. The adaptation must be done in a timely manner—the process of 
adapting to changes (generating and validating revised plans, application of system configuration 
changes) must be faster than the propagation of effects in order to maintain a high probability of 
achieving the intended objectives of the system. The timeliness is akin to ‘time to criticality’ in fault 
protection and hazard assessments, or control latency in control theory.  
The ability to adapt to change can be allocated to the end product (in our domain, the spacecraft or rover) 
or to some other element of the larger system (e.g., the users or operators). If the adaptation process 
involves the users or operators, then there is a much longer timeframe for reacting to changes. For the 
envisioned missions and systems discussed in the study, the dynamic and uncertain nature of the 
environment, coupled with the long distances and time delays, often requires that the adaptation be 
performed autonomously. Therefore, much of the discussion at the workshops and during the study period 
focused on ways and means to develop and operate systems that have autonomous resilience capabilities. 
Despite this attention to autonomy, significant benefits are also expected when resilience is explicitly 
                                                
1 See Appendix D for a listing of some of the definitions proposed and discussed during the study. 
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treated in the design of a broad range of engineered systems—whether highly autonomous or not, 
primarily in probability of mission success. For example, the loss of the Galileo high-gain antenna (HGA) 
during the cruise to Jupiter had a huge impact to the mission (Jansma, 2011). In essence, the mission 
could not be accomplished without the HGA. However, due to the ingenuity of the operations team and 
the flexibility inherent in the Galileo design, adaptations were made to deal with this failure, and the 
mission science goals were eventually accomplished. The resilience exhibited by the Galileo mission 
system (the Galileo spacecraft, ground system, and operations team) allowed this adaptation to be 
possible. In practice, engineered systems (including operators and users) are only capable of successfully 
adapting to a subset of invalid assumptions. Further, autonomous adaptation will be limited to a smaller 
subset of failed assumptions. The goal of the study and of the follow-on work is to explore theories, 
methods, and technologies that (i) make the consideration of resilience explicit in the design process, and 
(ii) deploy autonomous adaptation capabilities to enable envisioned (and not yet imagined) missions, and 
to perform these missions with reduced cost and risk.  
2.1 Scientific Motivation and Opportunities 
Several distinct trends will influence space exploration missions in the next decade, including hazardous 
conditions, unknown or unpredictable conditions, various elements (multielement missions), and long-
duration flight. Destinations are becoming more challenging and science questions more sophisticated 
and, as mission experience accumulates, the most accessible targets are visited and the knowledge frontier 
advances to more difficult, harsh, and inaccessible environments. This leads to new challenges including: 
hazardous conditions that limit mission lifetime, such as the high radiation environment of Jupiter or the 
toxic atmosphere of Venus; unconstrained, navigation hazards, such as free-floating active small bodies; 
multielement missions to acquire information to answer more sophisticated questions, such as MSR; and 
long-range missions that must survive equipment failures over the span of decades, such as Kuiper belt 
exploration. These missions often take place without a priori knowledge of the most efficient data 
collection for optimum science return. Science objectives may have to be revised ‘on the fly’, with new 
data collection and navigation decisions on short timescales, rather than relying on Earth-based 
communications with increasingly longer light-time delays.  
Yet, even as science objectives are becoming more aggressive, several critical resources remain 
unchanged. Anticipated improvements in the DSN will only marginally improve the bandwidth and 
communications cadence to remote spacecraft. Physics imposes unsurpassable light-time delays. Fiscal 
resources are increasingly limited, with fewer flagship missions, smaller spacecraft, and less subsystem 
redundancy. As missions visit more distant and formidable locations, the job of the operations team 
becomes more challenging. Yet, mission budgets for operations support are limited, encouraging 
significant reductions in operations team size. How then can we continue to explore new and challenging 
locations without increasing risk or system complexity? 
These challenges are present in some degree for the entire Decadal Survey mission portfolio documented 
in Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013–2022 (National Research Council, 
2011), but are especially acute for the following examples.  
A Venus lander designed to sample the atmosphere and surface of Venus, to understand its differences 
from Earth, would have to perform its entire mission in mere hours; accumulated heat would quickly 
cause subsystem failure and eventual loss of the spacecraft. This would admit little or no direct control 
from the ground. Lander concepts such as the Venus In-Situ Explorer (VISE) (National Research Council, 
2003; Esposito, n.d.), Surface and Atmosphere Geochemical Explorer (SAGE) (Jones, 2003) or Venus 
Intrepid Tessera lander (VITaL) (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010a) call for in situ 
or contact instruments to get mineralogical data from the Venus surface during this short interval. These 
instruments (such as Raman or laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy [LIBS] spectrometers) have 
narrow fields of view, and would therefore require careful target selection for both science and 
engineering reasons. However, the uncertain surface morphology could leave the spacecraft oriented at 
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suboptimal angles and the restriction on ground interaction combined with a strong desire to understand 
unweathered bedrock material puts the science at risk. This mission would benefit from the application of 
autonomous capabilities to improve the probability of mission success, including the ability to select 
optimal science targets, downlinking the best data first and the ability to continue performing science as 
subsystems begin to fail.  
A Trojan asteroid tour and rendezvous mission presents another case of short timescales. The Trojan 
objects are thought to be ancient and relatively unprocessed remnants of the primitive solar system; their 
compositions will tell us a great deal about the distribution and migration of material throughout history. 
However, these objects are distant with very low albedo that prevents them from being accurately 
surveyed from Earth. A Trojan tour spacecraft (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010b) 
would therefore act as its own surveyor, finding new objects as it approaches and possibly discovering 
targets of opportunity on short notice. Little is known about the Trojans, so science observations and 
possibly the spacecraft trajectory would be redefined on the fly. Positional uncertainty would require 
rapid changes to the pointing and exposure parameters for both cameras and spectrometer instruments. 
The mission might achieve this by some combination of onboard replanning or fast reactions from the 
ground. Flybys are time-critical events where a retreat to safe mode results in irrecoverable loss of science 
yield.   
An MSR mission would return a sample from Mars to Earth for state-of-the-art analyses in laboratories 
all over the world, perhaps providing the ‘holy grail’ for understanding the history of Mars (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010c; 2010d; Mattingly and May, 2011). Such a mission 
includes the need for fast reconnaissance over long distances, interaction with an unknown physical 
surface, and strong desire to handle any possible degradation or faults while maintaining the mission plan. 
Sample handling introduces new challenges, as multiple spacecraft are envisioned to collect and transfer 
high-value samples through a long handling and return chain with many potential points of failure. 
Developing and operating this multispacecraft system in a cost- and mass-constrained world requires an 
understanding of risks and the tradeoffs inherent in their mitigation. Applying appropriate resilience 
techniques to circumvent, withstand, and recover from failure has high payoff in these scenarios. 
A common thread throughout all these scenarios is that the environment, science observations, and 
spacecraft capabilities are not fully known in advance, to a degree much greater than on historical and 
present missions. These missions will benefit from rapid mission planning (ability to reduce the duration 
of science planning cycle), onboard data understanding (ability to assess data relative to science 
objectives), graceful degradation (ability to continue science through faults and unexpected 
environmental interactions), and low-cost/low-risk cruise (ability to reduce workforce cost of cruise 
without increasing risk, including ability to hibernate). The promise of truly resilient spacecraft that can 
succeed and thrive in the presence of dynamic and uncertain situations opens up new frontiers of 
possibility without sacrificing cost or risk. The current development paradigm of determining all the 
factors that affect risk and mission success at design time, or in a slow ground-based reaction to changes 
in these assumptions, are coarse and costly tools for addressing the challenges posed by these missions. 
These missions can be done with current technology and the current development paradigm, but inclusion 
of proven resilience capabilities allows for otherwise unavailable design options, and cost- and risk-
avoidance approaches and methods. Both near term or far term, future missions will greatly benefit from a 
greater understanding and infusion of efforts made to understand and increase their resilience, whether the 
resilience is embedded in a better understanding of the design trades space, or is implemented in onboard 
autonomous capabilities. Incorporation of resilience to future spacecraft will reduce the risk in the 
collection of high-value science from more difficult, hazardous, and remote locations, enabling a greater 
science-cost benefit. 
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2.2 Technical Motivation and Opportunities 
The required resilience to implement these missions 
cannot be achieved by simply incrementally building on 
and extrapolating from the current state of the practice; 
it requires a fundamental paradigm shift in the way we 
conceptualize, design, implement, validate, operate, and 
evolve our systems. The current paradigm relies on 
traditional approaches to preserve the spacecraft in 
known environments and in response to internal 
faults—it employs hardware redundancy, shielding, 
hundreds of preprogrammed reflexes and large technical 
margins. These solutions have significant costs across 
multiple dimensions (e.g., power, weight, complexity) 
and have limited effectiveness in addressing 
environmental uncertainty. Continued reliance solely on 
these approaches limits the classes of missions we are 
capable of pursuing, limits the science return, and limits 
the level of resilience that is achievable for the missions 
we fly, hence translating to increased technical risk. There is a need for an addition to the traditional 
approaches that includes a balance of both reflex-oriented behavior and the ability to reason about the 
current state of the system and environment in a comprehensive way. The challenge is to figure out a way 
to effectively develop and integrate such capabilities in order to enable the new class of missions, to 
deliver an acceptable probability of returning high-value science (Figure 2-1).  
Our study program investigated the system capabilities and autonomy technologies that will be needed to 
achieve the required resilience for such missions, and the challenges of developing these technologies and 
capabilities. While we expect continued improvement in hardware reliability, robustness, and cost-
effectiveness, the exponential leaps envisioned will require significant advances in systems and software 
capabilities and, in many cases, renders currently used verification and validation (V&V) techniques 
nonscalable to such magnitudes. Therefore, we focused on (i) the novel systems engineering techniques 
needed to architect, design, implement, validate, and operate these systems, and manage their associated 
complexity; and (ii) the software technologies that will be relied upon to provide the requisite intelligence 
and behavior for these systems.  
The problem of achieving sufficient resilience does not lack for interest—researchers and practitioners in 
various environments are developing the frameworks, technologies, and applications to address this 
challenge from different perspectives and domains (safety, fault tolerance, systems engineering). What is 
missing is a venue for the integration of these ideas. Our study provided this essential catalyst, bringing 
together key participants in sessions structured to foster communication and focus on development of an 
actionable plan. 
The timeliness of this study is based on three key factors:  
1. Recent scientific developments: as mentioned above, the recently published Planetary Science 
Decadal Survey (National Research Council, 2011) called out at least two high-priority New 
Frontiers missions that will require the type of resilience we are proposing to address (Venus In-
Situ Explorer [VISE] and Trojan Tour & Rendezvous [TTRV]). Also underscoring the need to 
address the resilience challenge is the recent identification by the Kepler space telescope of many 
extrasolar planets in the habitable zone around other stars (Borucki et al., 2011). This discovery 
prompts the space science and exploration community to begin conceiving missions that have 
sufficient resilience to enable exploration of these planets.  
 
Figure 2-1: A new paradigm is needed to achieve 
acceptable risk for highly complex missions in highly 
unknown/uncertain environments. 
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2. Momentum building in the NASA community: the issues of system complexity and robustness, 
two key facets of the resilience problem, have been the focus of significant attention recently in 
the NASA community. For example, the recent NASA Flight Software Complexity study 
(Dvorak, 2009) identified some of the fundamental software-related challenges to be addressed in 
order to achieve resilience. The Science Mission Directorate sponsored the first fault management 
(FM) workshop (Fesq, Fretz, and Newhouse, 2013) to identify and characterize the problems 
faced by recent missions; a follow-on FM workshop was held on April 9–12, 2012. Finally, 
NASA’s Office of the Chief Engineer has convened the NASA Integrated Model-centric 
Architecture (Conroy, Mazzone, and Lin, 2013) activity to leverage the game-changing potential 
of model-based systems engineering as a means to conquer system complexity. Each of these 
efforts targets a different aspect of the broader resilience challenge. 
3. Maturity of relevant technology: Missions like Earth Observing One (EO-1) (Chien et al., 2005) 
and Deep Space One (DS-1) (Rayman, Varghese, Lehman, and Livesay, 2000) have flight-
demonstrated certain key technologies and architectural concepts that are required for truly 
resilient space systems, but these applications have not focused on achieving the levels of 
robustness and adaptability to uncertain environments required to confidently execute scenarios 
like those described above. State-of-the-art autonomous control architectures (e.g., JPL’s Mission 
Data System (MDS)) that take a more holistic approach to autonomy and fault management have 
been successfully demonstrated in prototype system environments, but have not yet found a 
project customer to fully deploy these capabilities.  
Some of the relevant technologies and techniques include model-based systems engineering (e.g., JPL’s 
Integrated Model-Centric Engineering initiative (Bayer et al., 2010)), model-based reasoning (e.g., 
Remote Agent’s Livingstone diagnosis and repair system—NASA Software of the Year 1999 (Williams 
and Nayak, 1996)), deliberative planning and scheduling with plan repair (e.g., JPL’s Continuous Activity 
Scheduling Planning Execution and Replanning [CASPER] planning and execution system (Chien, 
Knight, Stechert, Sherwood, and Rabideau, 1999)), smart executives (e.g., Remote Agent EXEC 
system—NASA Software of the Year 1999 (Gat, 1997)), automated data analysis (e.g., JPL’s 
Autonomous Exploration for Gathering Increased Science [AEGIS]—NASA Software of the Year 2011 
(Estlin et al., 2012)), formal methods for software V&V (e.g., Simple Promela Interpreter [SPIN] model 
checker (Holzmann, 1997)), sensor fusion, integrated system health management, adaptive control 
systems, and machine learning techniques. Many of these technologies are fairly mature (Technology 
Readiness Levels [TRL] 7–8, having been flight validated (Mankins, 1995)), and are ready to be 
integrated into a system context. 
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3.0 STUDY DESCRIPTION 
The study consisted of two workshops, separated by a 
seven-month focused study period. This structure was 
chosen to allow the topic to be explored in multiple ways, 
and allow for continued opportunity for collaboration 
between the workshops. The study focused on areas of 
resilience that we felt needed additional exploration and 
integration, namely, system and software architectures, 
approaches, and capabilities. While also an important 
element, resilience in hardware is being addressed in 
multiple other venues, including other KISS studies. 
The structure and themes for our study are shown in Figure 3-1. The first workshop explored the 
‘problem space’ as an organizing theme, and the second workshop explored the ‘solution space’. 
Summary descriptions of each workshop are included below, and detailed agendas for each workshop are 
included in Appendix B. 
The first workshop was held July 28 through August 3, 2012. The first day of the workshop was marked 
by a series of short courses to present fundamental ideas related to resilience. The day was moderated by 
Len Reder (JPL), who introduced the session with some key questions about the nature of resilient 
systems. The specific short courses presented were  
(www.kiss.caltech.edu/workshops/systems2012/index.html):  
• “Principled System Architecture” (Dr. Robert Rasmussen, JPL) 
• “Capturing Flight Software Architecture using Domain-Specific Language” (DSL; Dr. Kim 
Gostelow, JPL) 
• “Control Theory and Methods” (Dr. Richard Murray, Caltech) 
• “Autonomy Practices” (Dr. Brian Williams, Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT]) 
• “Ultra-Reliability for Interstellar Missions” (Dr. Henry Garrett, JPL) 
"If you want to build a ship, don't 
drum up people to collect wood, and 
don't assign them tasks and work; 
but rather teach them to long for the 
endless immensity of the sea.” 
 
Antoine de Saint-Exupery 
 
Figure 3-1: Structure of Study  
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In support of the theme of ‘exploring the problem space’, a different topic was designated for each day of 
the workshop. These topics and areas of focus are shown in Figure 3-2. The first topic was need, and 
focused on the vision behind the study, and rationale and need from the science perspective. This day was 
moderated by Dr. Michel Ingham (JPL), who led discussions to establish a vision and conceptual basis for 
resilience in engineered systems, document science motivation for resilience, and capture a set of driving 
reference missions. The second topic was adaptability, moderated by Dr. Richard Murray (Caltech). 
Discussions on this day focused on establishing key architectural attributes for adaptability, documenting 
key capabilities for resilient systems, and determining challenges to realizing envisioned systems. The 
third topic was trust, moderated by Dr. Brian Williams (MIT). These discussions addressed key 
architectural attributes for trustworthy resilience, and the documentation of development-time and run-
time approaches for achieving trust in future resilient systems. On the final day of the workshop, 
moderated by John Day (JPL), the topic was synthesis, and discussions focused on weaving together the 
disparate discussions and thoughts from the prior four days into a focused plan for the study period.  
During these four days, there were a series of talks given by study participants and invited speakers. 
These talks were grouped into two categories: context talks, intended to provide additional background 
for consideration of resilience in space systems, and provocative talks, intended to spur discussion and the 
generation of new ideas. A full listing of these talks is included in Appendix B. On Wednesday afternoon, 
there was a session for the postdoctoral students and early career hires to present their interests and 
research. In addition, as a wrap-up activity, on Thursday afternoon, each participant gave a 2-minute 
lightning talk, which was their opportunity to summarize the important aspects of the workshop from 
their perspective. We found this activity to be a very important tool for collecting input from each 
participant, and provided a useful summary of the themes of the workshop. Additional information on the 
lightning talks is described in Section 4.1. 
The work to be performed during the study period was defined on the last day of Workshop #1, as part of 
the synthesis activity on that day. The study participants, after spending the prior days discussing the 
nature of resilience and its impact on future science missions, decided to split into three focus groups, 
each with a particular thrust, to explore specific ideas further. The three focus groups and areas of 
exploration were: 
 
Figure 3-2: Workshop #1 Themes and Topics 
 11 
1. Reference missions: address/refine need by exploring reference missions 
2. Capability survey: look both inside and outside NASA to collect, document, and assess efforts 
and technology that could be used to address the science need 
3. Architecture: analyze the impact of architecture on system resilience, and provide principles and 
guidance for architecting greater resilience 
In each of these focus areas, a subset of the study participants worked together to plan and execute their 
efforts. A detailed description of the work performed and resulting products is described more fully in 
Section 4.1 of this report.  
The second workshop was held February 26–28, 2013. In the final workshop, we reviewed the work 
performed by the focus groups during the study period in a series of outbriefs, and then began the two-
step process of exploring the ‘solution space’. The first step consisted of a reference mission exercise to 
focus on specific/concrete needs, and the second step was a synthesis and planning session. The scope of 
the workshop is shown in Figure 3-3, and the flow of activities is shown in Figure 3-4. 
For the reference mission exercise, the participants were split into three teams, each with the intent of 
reviewing a specific reference mission. Each of these teams cut across the focus groups in order to 
encourage cross-fertilization of ideas in these discussions. Each team was tasked with looking at key 
needed capabilities for a specific reference mission. The purpose of the exercise was to understand the 
mission science goals for each reference mission, and assess the evolvability and extensibility of 
capabilities by reviewing their utility to an interstellar rendezvous mission. Each team was asked to: 
• Review and assess associated mission resilience needs 
• Identify and prioritize potential capabilities, technologies, and architectural characteristics to meet 
needs 
• Develop a roadmap for identified capabilities/technologies/architectures (in particular, ideas for 
near-term tech development proposals) 
 
Figure 3-3: Workshop #2 Activities and Topics 
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The three reference missions used for this exercise, with the rationale for their selection and the 
moderators for each, were: 
• Venus lander: extremely short mission, unknown sampling conditions (L. Tamppari) 
• MSR chain: including the 2020 Mars Surface Mission (MSM) in the near term and future stages 
of sample return, which will require spacecraft with very different capabilities (T. Estlin) 
• Trojan tour and rendezvous: long cruise, flyby-type encounters that are known only a few days in 
advance, unknown characteristics of bodies, perhaps hazardous debris (J. Day) 
The synthesis and planning session was divided into three elements: (1) reassessment of results by each of 
the original focus groups, (2) a round of lightning talks by each participant, and (3) a group discussion of 
future plans and proposals for pursuing the ideas developed during the two workshops and study period. 
The results and conclusions of these discussions are described in Section 4.1. 
The second workshop also included a set of talks by study participants, but these focused primarily on the 
research and topics of participants new to the study. In particular, the following talks were given 
(www.kiss.caltech.edu/workshops/systems2013/index.html): 
• “Formalization of Systems Engineering and System Health Management” (Dr. Stephen Johnson, 
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs) 
• “Model-Driven Development of High-Assurance Dynamically Adaptive Systems” (Dr. Betty 
Cheng, Michigan State University) 
• “Autonomous Underwater Explorers” (Rich Camilli, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute 
[WHOI]) 
• “A Framework for Resilient Architecture” (Dr. Kim Gostelow, JPL) 
• “Resilience and Cybersecurity” (Dr. Howard Shrobe, DARPA) 
 
Figure 3-4: Workshop #2 Flow of Activities 
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4.0 OUTCOMES OF THE STUDY 
4.1 Focus Group Outcomes 
4.1.1 Reference Mission Focus Group Outcomes 
This purpose of the Reference Mission Focus Group was to expound upon the need for resilient systems 
from the perspective of the science community. The charter of this focus group included the following 
deliverables: 
1. Definition of vision and mission statements to guide our work, 
2. Creation of a list of resiliency needs that the current set of reference missions have, and 
3. Identification of metrics by which different proposed technologies and/or approaches can be 
assessed in terms of their efficacy in addressing the reference mission needs 
The group accomplished this work primarily through e-mail and biweekly teleconferences.  
To better understand the needs and perspectives of scientists working on future missions, we surveyed the 
set of reference missions from the Decadal Survey, and performed a very productive series of interviews 
with knowledgeable scientists/engineers for 10 different future missions. These interviews were performed 
using a set of specific questions intended to elicit capabilities that would drastically improve or enable 
science from these missions. In doing so, we began relationships with those people that may lend 
themselves to future endeavors (e.g., future proposals or perhaps for technology infusion into their 
missions). The specific missions and the individuals that participated in the interviews are captured below: 
• Venus Orbiter (Kevin Baines) 
• Venus Lander (Sue Smrekar) 
• Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (Sue Smrekar) 
• Mars Science Laboratory/Curiosity (Joy Crisp) 
• Mars Sample Return (Erik Nilson) 
• Trojan Asteroid Flyby and Rendezvous (Julie Castillo-Rogez) 
• Europa orbiter mission (Dave Senske, Brian Cooke) 
• Titan Balloon mission (Christophe Sotin) 
• Interstellar Probe (Gentry Lee) 
• Comet Surface Sample Return (Carol Raymond) 
These interviews increased our understanding of the needs of these reference missions that could be 
addressed or provided through capabilities enabled by advanced software/systems architecture 
approaches. There were many commonalities among the missions, including rapid science planning, 
‘smart’ science return, and maintaining science goals even with degrading/failing hardware/software. We 
developed categories for organizing the mission-specific needs into generic statements of capability: 
• Rapid mission planning 
 Ability to reduce the duration of science planning cycle, including ability to analyze 
current data, plan objectives, generate sequences, de-conflict operations, verify operations, 
and execute. Enable quick and robust reactions to new objectives. 
• Data processing 
 Ability to downlink best data first, including the onboard ability to recognize relative 
science value of collected data and to prioritize the downlink order in response. Also includes 
ability to provide thumbnails or other metadata to enable on-ground downlink decisions. 
• Graceful degradation 
 Ability to continue science through faults and unexpected environmental interactions. 
Not fail safe or fail operational but a level between, which uses system resources in a best 
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effort manner to achieve the most science through faults, single event upsets [SEUs], resets, 
etc. 
• Low-cost cruise 
 Ability to reduce workforce cost of cruise without increasing risk, including ability to 
hibernate and perform continuous thrusting over long mission cruise periods. 
We used common needs from the missions to set a rough priority for the capabilities. Figure 4-1 contains 
a summary of the capabilities and their assessed value to each mission. 
We used the information gained to focus the discussions in the second workshop by selecting resilience 
categories that were important to consider and by selecting representative (end member) reference 
missions to examine. The representative missions selected for the workshop activity were: 
• Venus Lander: lander, extremely short mission, unknown sampling conditions 
• MSR chain: may include Mars 2020, many different spacecraft with different needs, near-
term/realistic 
• TTRV: long cruise, flyby-type encounters that are known only a few days in advance, unknown 
characteristics of bodies, perhaps hazardous debris 
• Interstellar probe: very far in future, environment almost completely unknown, provides an 
ambitious long-range target for our vision for resilience; requires us to think about scalability and 
evolution of proposed technology 
For each of the four selected missions, we developed summary presentations that included a summary of 
the mission, key measurements, capability needs, mission requirements with success metrics identified, 
and mission requirements matched with resiliency need categories. These details are contained in 
Appendix E. 
 
Figure 4-1: Summary and Prioritization of Mission Resilience Needs 
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4.1.2 Capabilities Focus Group Outcomes 
The goal of the capabilities survey was to look at existing capabilities and formulate lists of the following: 
• Enabling software and autonomy technologies (e.g., modeling and knowledge representation, 
machine learning, automated reasoning, planning and scheduling middleware, languages, 
frameworks, runtime verification)  
• Key processes for agile and verifiable development enabling resilient system development and 
management of complexity 
From these lists, we have identified certain key capabilities areas that have potential based on existing 
work that has already been done and the current state of the technology. To do this, we started with a 
series of one-hour teleconferences, which led to several presentations being given at JPL. A single all-day 
meeting was held at Caltech to capture a broad set of capabilities. We surveyed the Capabilities Focus 
Group and developed the following sets of areas of interest: 
• Software (S/W) design patterns, DSLs, models for software synthesis, automated testing, and 
standards 
• Autonomy patterns, artificial intelligence (AI) planners, and self-adaptive software 
• Fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) patterns and their verification 
• Technologies taken from other domains (e.g., automotive manned aircraft, unmanned aerial 
vehicle [UAV], unmanned underwater vehicle [UUV], etc.) 
These areas were selected based on the group’s expertise and interests. Additional material has been 
produced and the summary of the group’s discussions is included in Appendix G of this report. 
4.1.3 Architecture Focus Group Outcomes 
This section of the report summarizes the activities and outcomes of the Architecture Focus Group. The 
objectives of this focus group were to analyze and discuss the impact of architecture on system resilience, 
and to provide principles and guidance for architecting our systems for greater resilience. To this end, the 
Architecture Focus Group held five teleconferences between the first workshop and the second workshop, 
and volunteered to work on various assignments between the teleconferences. The three primary activities 
of this focus group were:  
• Perform a focused literature review to orient and set context for the group’s efforts  
• Perform an analysis of architectural resilience, looking at examples (and counter-examples) of 
resilient architectures and the relevant characteristics they exhibit, and extracting a set of key 
tradeoffs and principles 
• Identify fruitful areas for future research in ‘architecting for resilience’ 
4.1.3.1 Literature Review 
Given the short period of the study, the Architecture Focus Group performed a limited review of the 
pertinent literature to provide appropriate context for the analysis. In particular, the group identified a 
small number of key references, focusing initially on recent writings from senior members of the focus 
group and the community, Bob Rasmussen and John Doyle. In addition, a few classic architecture 
references were identified as essential background for further work in this area.  
This preliminary literature review conducted by the focus group revealed a wealth of work in the 
individual areas of system architecture and resilience, but a comparatively small intersection of work in 
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architecting systems for resilience. Furthermore, almost no prior work was found in specific area of 
architecting resilient space systems.2  
The implication of this finding is that, in order to ground the future direction of study in this important 
area, the space domain will draw from principles developed and lessons learned in other disciplines, 
including biology (e.g., bacterial biosphere), computer science (e.g., internet), and power systems (e.g., 
smart grid). 
4.1.3.2 Analysis of Architectural Resilience 
The following section of the report addresses the Architecture Focus Group’s initial progress on an 
analysis of architectural resilience. The compilation of a more extensive bibliography of literature in this 
important area is identified as an important future step for research. 
Resilient Architecture Examples 
As part of the Architecture Focus Group’s analysis during the study period, a sample of existing known 
architectures was articulated and analyzed in terms of resiliency. These architectures are generally well 
known and are in some cases bio-inspired and in others, technology-inspired. A subset of the collected 
architectures is presented for analysis and discussion in Table 4-1.  
Table 4-1: Architecture Samples 
Architecture Description 
Starfish 
Geckos 
Worms 
Jellyfish  
These biological systems are designed to survive the loss of a limb or appendage. They benefit from 
an architecture that has appropriately placed possible failure points, that is, places where a limb or 
appendage can be more easily severed in the case of a predator grasping and removing it. The 
architecture provides the ability to regenerate tissue from these points.  
Bacteria 
Viruses 
Bacteria have the amazing ability to adapt, within a small number of generations, through mutation, 
easily developing resistance to antibiotics. 
Viruses can easily infect and cause changes to another organism's cells through transfer of genes from 
the virus to the host.  
Bacteria and viruses exhibit both Vertical Gene Transfer (VGT) and Horizontal Gene Transfer (HGT).  
Internet 
The internet is designed to be resilient to outages, by redirecting flow of information along a different 
path to get to the ‘customer’, hence the ability to reconfigure on the fly. However, it was not designed 
for the level of evolvability it has achieved (i.e., ability to reconfigure [e.g., plug-n-play] enabled it to 
incorporate new hardware and software). The internet adopted standardized protocols for information 
transfer enabling the above features. 
Columbus’ Expedition 
Columbus’s expedition made use of three ships. Each ship was diverse with respect to others in terms 
of capabilities and options. The largest ship, Santa Maria, sunk in 1492 but the expedition (mission) still 
succeeded. The expedition exhibited the ability to replan and adapt on the fly as needed. The ships’ 
diversity supported this. 
DARPA’s F6  
Fractionated 
Spacecraft (Brown 
and Eremenko, 2006) 
A subset of disaggregation approaches wherein the functionality provided by a single large monolithic 
satellite is delivered by a cluster of wirelessly networked modules and other networked nodes sharing a 
variety of H/W and S/W resources. F6 demonstrates several resilience heuristics such as functional 
and physical redundancy, graceful degradation, survivability, and diversity. 
While the above examples span a number of mission and system concepts we can already see similarity in 
them with respect to resilient architecture heuristics. Physical and functional redundancy are common 
themes in resilient systems.  
Resilient Architecture Characteristics 
                                                
2 Much of the published work in architecting for space systems has been in the area of ‘mission architecting’, which 
is a subset of the broader discipline of space system architecting focused on early mission formulation. 
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Next we examine some of the characteristics of the example architectures described above. In identifying 
characteristics, we examine each architecture’s robustness and fragility to external and internal 
disruptions (Table 4-2).  
Table 4-2: Characteristics of the Example Architectures 
Architecture Architectural Characteristics Robustness Fragility 
Starfish 
Geckos 
Worms 
Jellyfish  
Morphologic tissue regeneration. 
Targeted points of “frailty” lead to 
robustness.  
Self-healing 
Regenerative 
Target points of fragility 
result in robustness 
Weakened/degraded state 
(at least temporarily) 
Bacteria 
Viruses 
HGT - between organisms 
VGT - parent to child provides 
evolution/mutation at the genetic level 
Resistance to external 
factors (e.g., antibiotics) 
Survival - mutations within 
host cells protect virus 
VGT mechanism subject to 
rapid mutation and 
therefore deselection. 
HGT subject to resistance 
(antibiotic). 
Internet 
Structural redundancy 
Flexible/robust protocols (cognitive 
aspect/’smarts’ in the system) 
Functional redundancy 
Common I/O protocols 
Adoption of standards and 
standardization 
Global physical address 
space has led to security 
problems 
Columbus’ 
Expedition 
Distributed system 
Functional & physical redundancy 
Robust set of options/choices 
Functional redundancy 
Physical redundancy 
Diversity 
Each ship a single point of 
failure. All ships subjected 
to environment. 
DARPA’s F6  
Fractionated 
Spacecraft 
Distributed system   
Payload, communications, computing 
Functional & physical redundancy 
Standardized information protocol  
Significantly enhanced 
Adaptability and survivability 
Wireless communications 
can be a security threat 
Some of the general resiliency heuristics immediately evident in these architectures include:  
• Diversity 
 This heuristic describes the ability of a system to incorporate different functionality or 
capability into the system but not in a redundant sense such as hardware redundancy. The 
choice to use different types of ships on Columbus’ expeditions is an example of this. In the 
case of the DARPA F6 system, the use of dissimilar satellites (hence, dissimilar hardware, 
software, and platforms) leads to increased system resilience.  
• Functional and physical redundancy 
 Redundancy in this respect typically refers to replicated hardware and or software within 
systems in a fault-tolerant manner to overcome faults or disruptions to this system from 
external and/or internal factors. Several of the above examples provide clear descriptions of 
such redundancy.  
• Graceful degradation 
 This heuristic describes a resilient system’s ability to survive disruptions originating from 
within or without while still carrying out its missions. Examples of self-regenerative tissue in 
some of the biological examples above provide the species with the ability to go on living. 
Loss of function, capability, or capacity in technological systems allows the continuation of 
their mission with the same or reduced goals.  
• Self-regenerative or self-healing 
 These attributes exhibited in the first biological example have analogs in some of the 
technology examples. The internet has the ability to cut off nodes and links due to failures 
while incorporating new nodes and links on the fly so long as the standard protocols are 
satisfied. The F6 system, while not being able to regenerate new satellites immediately, 
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certainly has the ability to degrade gracefully to await a new replacement satellite to 
incorporate into the existing cluster.  
• Information transfer mechanisms 
 Bacteria and viruses exhibit HGT and VGT—communication of data across interfaces. 
Similarly, the internet incorporates protocols to do the same—transfer data/information both 
horizontally (node to node) and vertically (through the Open Core Protocol (OCP) stack 
layers from applications to physical layer). Likewise, the F6 architecture incorporates the 
internet protocol as well as a standardized messaging protocol across all nodes in the 
distributed system, thus mimicking HGT and VGT in the biological world.  
Resilient Architecture Tradeoffs 
Another way to understand resilience is in the context of the tradeoffs typically exhibited by resilient 
systems. Tradeoff analysis, which involves comparing the cost and benefits between two well-understood 
options, helps bridge the gap between the more abstract concepts of resilience present in nature to those 
relevant in the space domain. Tradeoff analysis is especially pertinent in the context of our resilience 
discussion, because the resilience of a mission is framed by its performance in the face of the risks, while 
tradeoff analysis inherently weighs the risks different options pose to the mission. 
• Passive vs. active resilience 
 One of the most useful ways to compare designs that provide resilience is to lay them out on 
a spectrum that runs between the categories of passive and active resilience. Passive 
resilience refers to properties that are inherently robust against classes of uncertainties, 
‘resilient-by-construction’. Examples of passive resilience include using a thicker casing for a 
satellite to mitigate the impact of micrometeorites and the longitudinal static stability of an 
aircraft in flight. Active resilience refers to the ability of a system to circumvent failure, 
attack, and adapt to changing mission objectives, and implies some form of control. 
Examples of active resilience include fault adaptive control, automated planning, and 
controller synthesis. 
• Reflexive vs. deliberative  
 The manner in which the active resilience is achieved can be further classified as reflexive 
versus deliberative. In the most general sense, this tradeoff addresses the question of how 
much online reasoning is required. More online reasoning demands more resources, such as 
processing and power storage,  potentially requires more V&V, and is less responsive, but has 
the benefit of being able to address novel or unaddressed situations. In the field of AI, these 
categories can be compared to weak AI (rule-based or behavior-based robotics to mimic 
human behavior) vs. strong AI (systems designed to meet or exceed human capabilities).  
• Resilience/robustness vs. efficiency/cost effectiveness 
 One explanation for the lack of adoption of resilience technologies is a perceived tradeoff 
between resilience and efficiency. In the context of space missions, where mission objectives 
emphasize new science, current practice allocates risk and funds to fly new science 
instrumentation, and depends on ‘tried-and-trusted’ supporting technologies and development 
approaches. Therefore, using mission funds to develop technologies for resilience reduces the 
apparent science return per dollar spent. However, this view does not take in all the 
considerations. From a probabilistic point of view, the real objective should be to maximize 
the expected value of science return. In other words, we need to take into account the 
uncertain variable, their interactions, and the associated loss of science value. 
 There is a precedent for flying resilience; historically, limited forms of resilience are present 
in riskier mission components such as engines (redundant valves) and sensors (voting 
mechanisms). But, as our missions evolve and become more complex, so will the interactions 
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between their components. This evolution demands a similar evolution in technologies for 
resilience. 
• Complexity vs. verifiability  
 As the complexity of a mission increases, so does the difficulty of verifying its behavior. In 
this tradeoff, we refer to a very general definition of complexity: the quality of having a large 
number of different parts and interconnections. Complexity can come from both the problem 
and the solution. Whether the problem is more complex or the engineered solution is more 
complex, both complicate verification.  
 Another complication to the V&V process is operating in the presence of unknowns. How do 
we even begin to write specifications for a spacecraft that must survive conditions that we 
aren’t even aware of? In addition, how do we verify such a spacecraft?  
 Mission complexity and operations in unknown environments challenge current V&V 
practices, and suggest that new V&V strategies will be needed for resilient systems. 
• Hierarchical vs. flat architecture 
 Hierarchies can be used to manage the complexity of a system by dividing it into layers. The 
principle is very general, and can be applied to ideas (network protocols such as Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI)), structures (the use of walls and floors to partition a 
building), and processes (build subassemblies before the final assembly). It has been argued 
as not only commonly occurring in nature (Doyle and Csete, 2011), but as a logical construct 
(Simon, 1962).  
 In this tradeoff, we express the question of how much hierarchy is needed. When conveying 
the functionality of a system to another human, hierarchy provides a mechanism by which we 
can organize and communicate ideas, at the cost of possibly ignoring important cross-
hierarchy details. In contrast, a decision-making algorithm might be capable of considering 
more simultaneous possibilities, effectively flattening the hierarchy.  
Resilient Architecture Principles 
One of the most important aspects of architecting is conveying a unified understanding of the system to 
all those who will develop and use it. Towards this end, principles provide the foundational ideas upon 
which a system is built. In order to distill the key principles of architecting resilient systems, the 
Architecture Focus Group surveyed papers, books (Maier and Rechtin, 2009), and architectures of both 
resilient and non-resilient systems. In this section, we specifically address only those principles that we 
believe to be important for resilient systems. We assume that general principles of architecting, such as 
controlling complexity to promote understanding, providing a coherent rationale for requirements, and its 
importance as an overtly distinct and sustained effort (Rasmussen and Muirhead, A Case for Model-Based 
Architecting in NASA), are equally important and continue to apply. 
• Options  
 Increasing the diversity and/or redundancy of options available to a resilient system provides 
the resources needed to recover from failures, tackle new challenges, and meet unknown 
situations. Diversity provides resilience to unknowns by providing a breadth of functionality 
(e.g., a child who falls from a bike and can’t walk can still use his/her hands to call for help). 
Redundancy provides resilience through failures (e.g., a power surge in one computing core 
could cause another computing core to come online, or multiple replicated cores to continue 
the computations).  
 In the particular case of space missions, where resources are expensive to launch and 
maintain, perhaps the best way to provide options is through overlapping functionality, a 
blend of diversity and redundancy. For example, a satellite with both a high-bandwidth 
antenna for transmitting images and a low-bandwidth antenna for telemetry could use its 
processor and the low-bandwidth antenna to transmit digested information if the high-
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bandwidth antenna fails. In this case, while both antennas have different degrees of 
functionality, they share enough in common to support another purpose. 
• Modularity and interfaces 
 In order to more easily use our options, they should be modular and support some uniformity 
in their interfaces. To say it another way, modularity implies some degree of 
interchangeability, and therefore some uniformity to their interfaces.  
 Biologists Gerhart and Kirschner coined the phrase “constraints that de-constrain” (Kirschner 
and Gerhart, 2005; Gerhart and Kirschner, 2007). This phrase expresses the naturally 
occurring phenomenon in which the presence of constraints can actually enhance the ability 
of an animal to survive, adapt, and evolve. For example, bacteria use ribonucleic acid (RNA) 
to encode their genes, but can use horizontal gene transfer to swap segments of RNA between 
individuals, allowing a bacterial colony to quickly adapt, and ultimately evolve through the 
persistence of those fragments. In the man-made world, the Universal Serial Bus (USB) 
interface has allowed a variety of peripherals to thrive, the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) supports a wide range of applications, and LEGO® 
blocks allow children to explore an unimaginable set of combinations. 
 A consistent, uniformly applied interface to different elements of a space mission would 
allow a single mission to swap between options in order to adapt, and enable the reuse of 
technologies from one mission to the next. 
• Ability to choose 
 How a particular resilient system chooses between options can vary greatly and provide 
different degrees of resilience. Mechanical options such as self-healing materials and 
overflow pipes could be considered a type of choice driven by physical means. From a 
cognitive perspective, reflexive behaviors, voting systems, fault-tolerance methods, decision 
making, planning, and, of course, humans can also provide the ability to choose. 
• Characterization of uncertainties 
 In order for us to talk about a resilient system we need to be able to answer the question, 
“What is it resilient to?” For example, a wallet can be considered resilient to its daily abuses 
of being folded and unfolded, but we would not generally consider a wallet to be resilient to 
fire. When architecting a resilient system, it is important that the developers, operators, and 
end-users know the tolerances of the system.   
4.1.3.3 Directions of Future Work 
The work of the Architecture Focus Group identified numerous areas for future research and development 
in the area of architecting resilient space systems. 
• Development of methodologies and systems engineering frameworks for architecting resilient 
systems; a representative example of such a framework has been proposed in (Rasmussen and 
Muirhead, A Case for Model-Based Architecting in NASA) 
• Development of architectures for resilient space systems; two such architectures have emerged 
from our study: 
 The Resilient Spacecraft Executive proposed in the KISS Technical Development proposal 
submitted by Murray, Ingham, et al. entitled “Resilient Space System Architectures: 
Demonstration of Risk-Aware Hibernation Capabilities using Earth-Based Analogues” 
(described in Section 4.4.1 of this report). 
 The hierarchical flight software architecture concept proposed by Gostelow, Doyle, and 
Ingham, described in Appendix F of this report, which inherits and extends concepts from 
another resilient spacecraft architecture, JPL’s Mission Data System (Ingham, Rasmussen, 
Bennett, and Moncada, 2005). 
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• Development of architectural analysis tools, e.g., for performing tradeoffs between system 
attributes like execution time and mission flexibility; such tools will be used to inform system 
designers about the appropriate allocation of capabilities to different layers in a specified 
architecture, given a particular system, operational environment, and mission context. This 
advancement has been proposed as part of the KISS Technical Development proposal submitted 
by Murray, Ingham, et al. 
4.2 Insights from Lightning Talks 
Toward the end of both workshops, we had all participants present lightning talks. We labeled these 
lightning talks because each one was limited to two minutes and a single slide. This had the benefits of 
allowing all participants a chance to present their thoughts and the time constraint required a measure of 
focus that encouraged presentation of the most significant ideas. There were two motivations for doing 
these talks: (1) provide each participant a last word to wrap up the workshop, and (2) compile a set of 
slides representing a collective view on the subject of resilience from which we could draw themes and 
possibly reach new conclusions. This section represents a collective view of the lightning talks presented. 
All the slides were reviewed and several themes picked out based on ideas that were repeatedly expressed 
in the talks. 
From the first workshop lightning talks, we isolated several key ideas that seemed explicitly apparent: 
What are the metrics? Technologies borrowed from other domains are useful. Further, a set of 
technologies that were called out in discussions during the first workshop also showed up in the lightning 
talks for this workshop.  
4.2.1 What are the Appropriate Metrics?  
Any proposal will have to show quantitative value so this is needed for a technology program to be 
funded. Kim Gostelow presented a concept for utilizing the concept of an objective function that 
characterizes the success of a system in reaching defined goals. Then, if the notion of the goals being 
perturbed is added and measured using our objective function, it might be possible to analytically measure 
the sensitivities of various systems to perturbations, and thus characterize a metric for resilience of 
systems (Figure 4-2). John Doyle is also developing various theories for optimizing architecture using 
analytic means. Perhaps these could be applied to current missions showing varying resilience 
capabilities. 
4.2.2 Borrow Technologies from Other Domains  
A strategy that appeared repeatedly in both workshops was to consider applications of techniques for 
resilience in other domains. Basic technologies to implement resilience in space systems already exist in 
other domains (e.g., AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture [AUTOSAR] (Heinecke et al., 2004), 
Robot Operating System [ROS] (Quigley et al., 2009), Integrated Modular Avionics [IMA] (Morgan, 
1991), UAVs; see capabilities results). How can progress and/or even models and code developed for 
other domains (e.g., cars, planes, Earth-based robots) be translated toward resilient spacecraft 
applications?  
4.2.3 Observations on Technology  
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Fundamental barriers to resilience technology adoption exist due to a lack of common conceptual 
foundation. Tools are being developed under programs such as Adaptive Vehicle Make (AVM)/META 
(DARPA Tactical Technology Office, n.d.) that will enhance passive (or latent) resilience; however, more 
efforts are needed. In particular, more techniques are needed to enable better exploration of the space of 
uncertainty and its impact, including machine learning, search-based techniques, probabilistic reasoning, 
and more advanced goal-based modeling. Investment in new methodologies for managing and analyzing 
the information is needed (e.g., methods for Model-Based Systems Engineering [MBSE]). Architectural 
analysis and metric tool development are needed. There is a need for formal and analyzable DSLs for 
specification of (discrete) mission performance, concept of operations (conops), and 
system/environmental uncertainty. Notations such as set-based languages will be required (i.e., 
specification of partial orders, lattices, etc.). There is a need for a collection of formal and lighter weight 
reasoning techniques to be used at different stages of the design process (e.g., architecting, validation, 
verification), as well as during run-time operation. Given the increasing complexity of these systems, 
these reasoning techniques should be applicable to models as well as code, and be applicable at design 
time and at run time. Advanced synthesis tools for ‘correct-by-construction’ designs are needed. 
It was noted that spacecraft in general could utilize better time-enabling rapid autonomous reaction, 
parallel functionality, better onboard power management, smarter downlink, and operation under varying 
environmental conditions, etc. 
Finally, during the first workshop, the bacterial biosphere was identified as being a unique example of 
resilience. Bacterial resilience after environmental perturbation was discussed. It was explained that such 
bacterial systems can present many related species, which, over time, may present unique and novel 
genetic attributes compared to near relatives allowing evolvable characteristics that can adapt to certain 
environmental changes. New resistant species can become the dominant majority in the face of many 
species dying off (becoming extinct). In this way, a bacterial biosphere is an illustration of an extremely 
resilient system. The bacterial biosphere has inspired new self-correcting, evolving, and adaptive software 
architectures that have new resilience to changes in the environment. 
The second workshop lightning talks presented considerably different themes than the first workshop. 
Discussions continually mentioned architectural versus capabilities trades and V&V was a recurring 
theme as well. Notions of spacecraft functionality to perform automated self-repairs (i.e., self-healing, 
self-awareness, collective redundancy) were discussed but only in a few of the lightning talks. 
Nevertheless, this is an important area as it relates to concepts of redundancy where a system uses extra 
 
Figure 4-2: Towards a Measure of Resilience (Gostelow) Lightning Talk 
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parts to fix itself through fine-grain repurposing. Finally, several talks mentioned possible demonstrations 
of resilience but also discussed the political barriers that stand in the way of realizing true resilience 
within our flight systems (see politics and demonstrations). Each of these themes is discussed in the 
following subsections. 
Verification & validation. Can we capture an interface between learning and aspects of operation and 
use this to formulate system design policy as a central feature throughout lifecycle used to establish trust 
early? Can we set up early V&V? V&V is critical and presents a unique challenge to ensure trusted 
resilience. Enhanced behavioral modeling integrated with the V&V process is needed. Resilience, 
assurance, and V&V must be inherent parts of model creation/modification to handle uncertainty in 
systems resulting from environment changes (e.g., resilient by construction). The V&V envisioned is not 
traditional—we are thinking of new forms of design-time and run-time V&V methods. Design-time V&V 
is integrated into the design process and enables scalability with system size and complexity as the system 
grows while guaranteeing decent coverage in the face of uncertainty resulting from intractable system 
state space. Run-time V&V is embedded into the system for execution during run-time and is a useful 
approach for verification of evolving systems and in situ validation of learned capabilities. In a learning 
environment, V&V is a challenge, since it is not obvious how to define specifications for verification of 
the evolving system. Both these approaches provide rapid V&V to support changing modular software 
(i.e., agile validation) that is essential for testing new complex systems (to demonstrate technological 
readiness) and establishing trust in autonomy capabilities needed for resilience in unknown environments. 
Politics and demonstrations. Releasing a resilient architecture framework as an open-source project is a 
compelling demonstration vehicle. We could target possible early adopters to help kick start such an 
effort and target the robotics community by providing a few useful algorithm implementations. The group 
struggled to decide on a useful platform that would be large enough to be taken seriously. A possible 
demonstration using a CubeSat where behavior of planned and randomized failures of components would 
be implemented was presented. Small doesn’t mean lack resilience, perhaps the problem is that most 
CubeSats are programmed by students without resilience as a primary goal. 
Another approach toward a demonstration would be focus on a different nonspace domain, perhaps a 6-
month underwater mission with relatively cheap hardware (failures will happen). This would provide a 
demonstration of what can be done and create a pull from scientists to overcome reluctance of engineers 
in the spaceflight community. 
Many key technologies (capabilities) for engineering resiliency already exist. For example, we know how 
to build systems that do online planning, making use of onboard models, including structured goals, fault 
management, and learned behavior. Architectures that support these capabilities already exist (e.g., 
autonomous vehicles). We have demonstrated driving in environments that are not known in advance and 
have lots of mechanisms to ensure safety in the presence of failures. Therefore, efforts to demonstrate 
these capabilities in using alternate funding sponsors are essential. 
4.3 Roadmap for Technical Development  
As described above, one of the key outcomes from the study was the development of a roadmap of key 
resilience-related capabilities. This roadmap was developed as a product of the reference missions 
exercise, which captured the mission resilience needs for three selected reference missions; identified and 
prioritized the capabilities, technologies, and architectural characteristics to meet these needs; and 
developed a set of roadmaps for each of the reference missions. Finally, these three roadmaps have been 
analyzed and synthesized to extract key patterns of capability that are prime targets for investment by 
technology development programs. In this section of the report, we will first summarize the individual 
roadmaps for each reference mission, and then discuss the synthesized capability patterns. 
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4.3.1 Venus Lander 
The capability roadmap for the Venus Lander mission is presented in Figure 4-3. The key high-level 
mission capabilities of safe landing and landed science operations were identified as drivers for resilience. 
To achieve the safe landing capability, we have identified three resilience-related enabling capabilities: 
landing hazard recognition, landing hazard avoidance, and graceful degradation. In the context of safe 
landing, graceful degradation relates to the ability of the lander spacecraft to continue operating through 
faults and unexpected environmental interactions, using system resources in a best effort manner to get 
the spacecraft safely to the planetary surface. Rather than gracefully degrading, recent missions have 
disabled their fault protection capabilities for entry, descent, and landing (EDL), and have relied on a 
carefully designed and painstakingly developed control sequence to provide some level of robustness 
through redundancy management. Landing hazard recognition, landing hazard avoidance, and graceful 
degradation capabilities are discussed in more detail below, under Synthesis of Capability Patterns.  
To achieve the landed science operations capability, we have identified the following enabling 
capabilities: detection of interesting phenomena, onboard science analysis, onboard science planning, 
sampling hazard recognition, sampling hazard avoidance, and graceful degradation. The surface mission 
will achieve resilience through onboard science autonomy because of the short lifetime of the spacecraft 
in the Venus environment. In this context, the graceful degradation capability is absolutely critical to 
enable the mission to squeeze the most science possible out of its limited lifetime. Graceful degradation 
will be achieved via a multifaceted strategy, including fault-tolerant control to robustly accomplish the 
current science goals, diagnosis of failures and prognosis of incipient failures, and a range of recovery 
options including system reconfiguration to accommodate the degradation and task replanning to shed 
 
Figure 4-3: Capability Roadmap for Venus Lander Mission. Key mission-level capabilities are identified on the right-hand side of 
the roadmap. The arrows incoming to each capability node indicate supporting capabilities that enable that capability. The red, 
orange, and green color coding is used to identify particular capability dependency patterns that are common to the three 
reference mission roadmaps we developed. Blue nodes indicate other supporting capabilities for the Venus Lander mission that 
are not common across the three reference missions.  
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science goals that are no longer achievable due to the degraded capability. 
4.3.2 Mars Sample Return 
The MSR campaign encompasses a particularly complex set of missions, each requiring multiple system 
elements and multiple mission-critical activities. The capability roadmap for this mission is presented in 
Figure 4-4, with particular focus on the first mission of the campaign, the sample collection and caching 
mission. In this mission, the key high-level capabilities include safe precision landing, robust telecomm 
link maintenance, long-distance unattended traverse to/from the sampling sites, and sample collection and 
caching. Additional high-level mission capabilities for the follow-on sample return missions are also 
identified (cache manipulation, launch from mars surface, and on-orbit rendezvous with orbiting sample), 
but due to the limited scope of the study, these high-level capabilities are not further elaborated into 
enabling capabilities. With respect to the safe precision landing capability, the enabling supporting 
capabilities are the same as those called out for the Venus Lander’s safe landing capability. An additional 
capability that enables a high-precision landing, terrain-relative navigation, is not currently called out in 
the roadmap, but is not deemed a critical omission because this capability is the target of ongoing 
investment at NASA and elsewhere.  
Robust telecomm link maintenance refers to the need for a resilient communication link to landed and 
landing assets on the surface of Mars. The importance of this capability was underscored for the Mars 
Science Laboratory (MSL) EDL: a few weeks prior to arrival of the MSL at Mars on August 5, 2012, 
Mars Odyssey, the critical orbiter identified for relay of MSL EDL telemetry to Earth, suffered an 
onboard fault that caused it to enter safe mode on July 11, 2012. Had the operations team not been able to 
 
Figure 4-4: Capability Roadmap for MSR Mission. Key mission-level capabilities are identified on the right-hand-side of the 
roadmap. The arrows incoming to each capability node indicate supporting capabilities that enable that capability. The red, 
orange, and green color coding is used to identify particular capability dependency patterns that are common to the three 
reference mission roadmaps we developed. Blue nodes indicate other supporting capabilities for the MSR mission that are not 
common across the three reference missions. 
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recover the spacecraft quickly enough (or if the fault had occurred closer to the critical MSL EDL event), 
the orbiter would have been unable to reposition itself in time to support EDL relay communications, 
Odyssey would have arrived over the landing area about two minutes after Curiosity landed, and NASA 
would have likely lost critical engineering telemetry from MSL during its descent and landing on the 
surface. While MSL’s landing success was not at risk, one of the mission requirements for capture and 
analysis of EDL telemetry for the purposes of state reconstruction, would not have been met. Although 
not further elaborated in the roadmap, robust telecomm link maintenance is enabled by supporting 
capabilities such as graceful degradation of the orbiting relay assets (e.g., whereby the relay orbiter might 
avoid entering safe mode leading up to a critical relay support activity like EDL, especially if the 
triggering fault was diagnosed to be non-mission-threatening), or of the direct-to-Earth (DTE) 
communication link. 
Long-duration unattended traverse to/from sampling sites is identified as an important capability for 
surface roving missions like MSR from a resilience standpoint. This mission will likely involve long 
traverses from the landing site to the sampling sites identified by the scientists as most interesting. The 
current operational paradigm involves a substantial operations team, which would be unnecessary if the 
rover could be trusted to largely take care of itself during comparatively routine activities like driving. 
While completely unattended traverse operations is unrealistic, entrusting the rover to manage many of 
the off-nominal situations it encounters while driving would enable a much leaner operations team to be 
at the console. This would enable a reduction in operations costs, and/or enable a significant portion of 
the operations team to focus on training for the more risky upcoming sample collection and caching 
operations, resulting in reduced risk for those critical scenarios. As shown in the roadmap, long-duration 
unattended traverse is enabled by capabilities that include driving hazard detection and avoidance, 
detection of interesting phenomena (which enables the rover to be alert to its surroundings; from an 
engineering perspective, it would recognize anomalous situations, such as changes in inclination or wheel 
slippage, and from a science perspective, it would not drive blindly past particularly interesting science 
sites), and graceful degradation (which enables the rover to be resilient to the wear and tear that would 
inevitably occur during long surface missions, as evidenced by the Mars Exploration Rovers Spirit and 
Opportunity). 
Finally, sample collection and caching is a driver for important resilience-related capabilities in the areas 
of drilling/coring problem detection and quick-turnaround sampling. However, due to the limited scope of 
the study, these capabilities are not further elaborated into enabling capabilities.  
4.3.3 Trojan Tour and Rendezvous 
The capability roadmap for the TTRV mission is provided in Figure 4-5. In this mission, the key high-
level capabilities include hibernation operations during the multiple cruise phases (both cruising to the 
Trojan belt, and cruising between asteroids in different segments of the belt), and science operations 
during asteroid encounters. In particular, streamlining hibernation operations is identified as a valuable 
low-hanging fruit for near-term investment in resilience capabilities (an analogous, but even less 
challenging problem than the long-duration unattended traverse capability described above). For long-
duration missions like TTRV, our current operational paradigm for large missions that employ a large 
operations team throughout the mission operations subphases will make it very challenging to achieve the 
significant cost reductions imposed by current NASA planetary science budgets. Our vision for resilience 
includes as an early accomplishment the development of a highly autonomous hibernation capability that 
can enable spacecraft to fend for themselves during long periods of routine and largely uninteresting 
operations, and be operated by a very small crew on the ground. The hibernation operations capability is 
enabled by a variant of the common graceful degradation capability, whereby the spacecraft would be 
endowed with the ability to diagnose and recover from many of the faults that cause spacecraft to go into 
safe mode today. 
 27 
Key to this is providing the spacecraft with the ability to make risk-informed decisions (risk-aware 
decision-making) and to engage with the operators on Earth when it assesses that a specified threshold of 
risk to the currently executing, high-level mission sequence has been exceeded. Recovery can take many 
forms, from simple side-swapping of redundant hardware or device resets, to more involved replanning of 
the current nominal sequence of tasks, subject to the constraints of the mission (e.g., a SEU-induced reset 
of an onboard science processor would not require safing of the spacecraft, because the symptoms 
associated with the reset would be recognized as non-threatening, but could require the spacecraft to 
reschedule a planned background science activity involving that processor to be performed after the 
upcoming telecomm link with Earth). Another key capability associated with unattended hibernation 
operations is the onboard detection of interesting phenomena. This would enable the hibernating 
spacecraft to “snooze with one eye open” (i.e., be on the lookout at some regular frequency for important 
science events that would be of likely interest to the scientists on the ground). Depending on the urgency 
of the type of science observation, the spacecraft could decide to call home at the earliest opportunity, or 
it could decide to store any interesting but non-urgent results in memory for downlink at some later time.  
 
Figure 4-5: Capability Roadmap for TTRV Mission. Key mission-level capabilities are identified on the right-hand-side of the 
roadmap. The arrows incoming to each capability node indicate supporting capabilities that enable that capability. The red, 
orange, and green color coding is used to identify particular capability dependency patterns that are common to the three 
reference mission roadmaps we developed. Blue nodes indicate other supporting capabilities for the TTRV mission that are not 
common across the three reference missions. 
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Because of the highly uncertain and likely dynamic environment encountered by the TTRV mission,3 
agile science operations during asteroid encounters is enabled by a set of capabilities that include the 
onboard detection of interesting phenomena, the ability to adapt to changing science goals, and the ability 
to gracefully degrade to avoid safing if at all possible during one-shot flybys of interesting asteroids. 
Similarly, the highly uncertain and dynamic environment implies that the spacecraft operations would be 
less risky with an onboard capability to detect and avoid environmental hazards (e.g., small asteroid 
debris, or outgassing plumes, if any are encountered). These capabilities are of broad applicability across 
the set of reference missions, and thus will be discussed in the TTRV context in more detail in the 
synthesis section below. 
4.3.4 Synthesis of Capability Patterns 
We have identified threads or patterns in the capability roadmaps that have wide applicability and are 
needed across diverse mission types. This set of capability patterns are identified in the capability 
roadmap figures by the red, orange, and green node colorings, and are summarized below and in 
Figure 4-6. Further analysis of the roadmaps is ongoing, and any additions or revisions to the identified 
patterns will be discussed in updates to this report. 
                                                
3 The Jupiter-orbit Trojans are dark bodies of irregular shape, varied sizes from ~200 km down to ~1 km or less, 
with unknown rotational periods on the order of hours, sometimes coupled in binary pairs, grouped in clusters that 
tend to overlap and merge with the overall swarm throughout their orbits (“Jupiter Trojan”, 2013). 
 
Figure 4-6: Common Capability Patterns for Resilience 
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4.3.4.1 Graceful Degradation Pattern  
This first capability pattern (shown in red) is crucial to realizing the vision of resilient space systems. 
Graceful degradation, by our definition, is the ability to continue operating through faults and unexpected 
environmental interactions. Not fail safe or fail fully operational, but a level in between, which uses 
system resources in a best-effort manner to achieve as many of its goals as possible, despite the 
occurrence of faults, SEUs, resets, etc. This encompasses general wear and tear management (i.e., the 
ability of a spacecraft to tend to its own failures and degraded functions, either by performing repair 
actions or coming up with creative workarounds) and best-effort fail-operational capabilities (i.e., the 
ability of a spacecraft to complete an important mission activity that would otherwise be lost due to a 
component failure or system safing response). As shown in Figure 4-6 (i), graceful degradation is enabled 
by a rich set of supporting capabilities, including fault-tolerant control of discrete/continuous systems, 
diagnosis and/or prognosis of system and component health, accommodation of or recovery from 
failure/degradation via automated system reconfiguration or task replanning, and risk-aware decision-
making. Many of these capabilities can be implemented either on the ground within software tools used 
by the operations teams, or as autonomous capability onboard the spacecraft. Our emphasis on the latter 
should not be construed as dismissive of the value of the former—indeed, wherever it makes sense, these 
capabilities will be instantiated as ground-based capabilities to validate them, as a precursor to eventual 
onboard deployment. 
Here are some examples of graceful degradation capability, with 
the elaborated enabling capabilities in italic: 
• The ability of a Mars surface rover to recognize a stuck 
front wheel motor (diagnosis), and recognize that its 
driving objective can best be accomplished by turning 
the rover around and dragging the stuck wheel, instead of 
pushing it (automated planning for system 
reconfiguration). This scenario actually occurred during 
sol 778 of the MER Spirit’s mission (Figure 4-7) (“Spirit 
(rover)”, 2013), except that operators on the ground, and 
not the rover itself, performed the reasoning required to 
determine that driving backwards was an 
appropriate mitigation for the failure.  
• The ability for a Venus Lander to determine that 
one of its computers is failing due to the 
tremendous heat on the Venusian surface 
(diagnosis), and to reallocate the failing 
computer’s control functions to other computers in 
its distributed processing architecture, to maximize 
the precious lifetime of the spacecraft (automated 
planning for system reconfiguration).  
• The ability of the TTRV spacecraft (Figure 4-8) to 
autonomously: (i) recognize the symptoms of 
incipient failure for one of its science camera 
instruments (diagnosis/prognosis), (ii) assess that 
the risk of losing the valuable science opportunity 
is high if we stick to the current flyby sequence, 
and make the executive decision to turn off the 
unreliable science camera during a particularly 
short-duration asteroid encounter flyby without 
 
Figure 4-7: The MER Spirit’s right-front wheel 
failed on sol 778. 
 
Figure 4-8: A Trojan Tour and Rendezvous mission 
will visit the Trojan asteroids (shown in green), which 
are in front of and behind Jupiter’s orbital path. 
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safing the spacecraft (risk-aware decision-making), and (iii) compensate for the loss in that 
particular set of science data by replanning a more extensive set of observations using the other 
onboard instruments (automated task replanning).  
• The ability for a hibernating TTRV spacecraft to recognize that one of its reaction wheels is 
beginning to show signs of degraded behavior (diagnosis/prognosis), and to adjust its onboard 
control policy to reduce reliance on this reaction wheel, in favor of the spare skew wheel or 
onboard thrusters, thereby hopefully extending the useful life of the degrading reaction wheel and 
saving it for the critical encounter flybys (fault-tolerant control of discrete/continuous systems). 
4.3.4.2 Data Understanding Pattern  
This second resilience capability pattern (shown in orange in Figure 4-6 (ii)) is a fundamental enabler for 
closing decision-making loops onboard the spacecraft, for both science and engineering analysis. Data 
understanding is a general capability that encompasses the interpretation of data into actionable 
information. This capability covers a set of capabilities ranging from simple pattern recognition, data 
classification, and data fusion, to more sophisticated capabilities for abstracting raw data into a model, 
which can be used to make more significant science decisions. From a science perspective, this includes 
feature detection in images, which can be used to identify scientifically interesting targets for further 
investigation (e.g., unusually shaped or colored rocks) or to recognize scientifically significant changes in 
the observable surface of a planetary body (e.g., lava flows from volcanic eruptions, or new craters). 
From an engineering perspective, very similar techniques can be used to analyze light detection and 
ranging (LIDAR) scans or images taken by a spacecraft descending toward a planetary body to identify 
landing hazards, and to interpret stereo images taken by a mobile rover to recognize driving hazards.  
Examples of initial deployments of data understanding capability in recent missions include: 
1. The autonomous science performed onboard the EO-1 mission (Chien et al., 2005), which 
enabled the spacecraft to autonomously detect and respond to dynamic scientifically interesting 
events observed from low Earth orbit (and in the process save approximately $1 million per year 
in operations costs);  
2. The AEGIS software deployed on the MER Opportunity (Estlin et al., 2012), which analyzes 
images onboard, detects and prioritizes 
science targets in those images, and 
autonomously obtains novel, high-quality 
science data of the selected targets within 
45 minutes, with no communication back 
to Earth required (Figure 4-9); and 
3. The autonomous navigation performed by 
the Deep Impact mission (Kubitschek et 
al., 2007), which closed the loop around 
images taken by the impactor spacecraft to 
autonomously track and successfully 
impact comet Tempel 1. 
In addition to these mission deployments, data 
understanding is a critical aspect of the terrain-
relative navigation (TRN) and hazard detection 
systems that are currently under development as 
part of NASA’s Autonomous Landing Hazard 
Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) program (Epp, 
Robertson, and Brady, 2008), which is being 
funded by the Office of the Chief Technologist to 
develop sensor hardware and software technology 
 
Figure 4-9: Science targets automatically detected by the MER 
AEGIS software on the MER Opportunity in April 2010. 
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for landing spacecraft autonomously, safely, and precisely on planetary bodies. These recent deployments 
and developments have enabled remarkable scientific and engineering accomplishments, but represent 
just the tip of the iceberg in terms of data understanding capability. The development of more 
sophisticated data understanding capability is becoming increasingly important as we develop truly 
intelligent spacecraft whose resilience is dependent on their ability to make more informed decisions 
onboard. 
4.3.4.3 Hazard Avoidance Pattern 
The third common resilience capability pattern (shown in green in Figure 4-6 (iii)) represents a critical 
capability for missions that a spacecraft must interact with a highly uncertain environment, such as those 
involving in situ exploration of planets and moons, or close interactive rendezvous with primitive solar 
system bodies. This capability represents the counterpart to the hazard detection/recognition capability 
discussed under the Data Understanding Pattern section above. The most common application of hazard 
avoidance capability in current space missions is in the context of surface rovers, which are required to 
avoid running into large rocks that could impede progress, or worse, damage the rover. Similarly but 
closer to home, the growing fleets of fully autonomous automobiles (inspired by DARPA’s recent Grand 
Challenges) rely on sophisticated hazard avoidance capability to enable them to safely navigate on and off 
roads with obstacles of many shapes and sizes, including moving pedestrians, cyclists, and other vehicles. 
Another important application of hazard avoidance capability is for spacecraft landing. Depending on the 
planetary body being targeted, the physics of the descent and landing problem can have particularly 
challenging requirements on timing (urgency), computation and resources (e.g., propellant), and thus 
represents a particularly prominent source of mission risk. As mentioned above, NASA’s ALHAT 
program (Figure 4-10) is making significant investments in algorithms for efficiently computing hazard 
maps and quickly interpreting them to select a safe landing site. 
Yet another application variant of hazard avoidance capability arises in the area of scientific sampling (e.g., 
using a robotic arm to dig into soil or drill into rocks to uncover interesting features for scientific analysis). 
Missions like the Mars Phoenix Lander and MSL have gone to great lengths to carefully consider and select 
appropriate sites/targets for sampling, not only to maximize the science return, but also to avoid the 
potentially mission-ending situation where the scoop or drill instrument gets inextricably caught in the 
ground or the rock. In current missions, the sampling hazard recognition and avoidance loop is primarily 
closed by human operators on the ground. Technology has been developed and demonstrated on the MER 
mission that enables automatic arm placement based on onboard hazard analysis (Hayati et al., 2007). 
Future missions like the short-lived Venus Lander or Lunar South Pole Sample Return mission will need to 
build on this class of technology to make arm placement risk assessments and decisions in situ. 
As shown in Figure 4-6 (iii), hazard avoidance 
is enabled by several supporting capabilities 
that include handling of environmental 
uncertainty and risk-aware decision-making. 
This is not to say that these are the only 
supporting capabilities required to implement a 
hazard avoidance capability, but rather, these 
are critical capabilities that are not already the 
focus of significant research and development 
investment (unlike hazard map generation, or 
path replanning for example), and which will 
enable significant advancements in the 
sophistication of hazard avoidance capabilities 
we will need on future missions. For example, a 
future application of risk-aware decision 
 
Figure 4-10: LIDAR elevation map with detected hazards, 
generated by the ALHAT technology. 
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making, handling of environmental uncertainty, and hazard avoidance capabilities is envisioned for 
missions being conceived to explore distant primitive bodies, at destinations like the Trojan asteroid field, 
which share the orbit of the planet Jupiter around the Sun. A mission like TTRV will encounter an 
unknown but undoubtedly highly dynamic environment. This mission will benefit greatly from a 
spacecraft with the onboard flexibility to cope with high uncertainty, assess the risk associated with 
operations in its environment, make local decisions that are informed by risk, and avoid low-albedo debris 
(small asteroids or outgassed material, if present) in the asteroid cloud. Flying such capabilities will likely 
reduce the risk associated with the mission, which, in turn, will likely enable a more scientifically 
interesting but challenging trajectory (e.g., closer flybys). 
We have developed a set of capability roadmaps pertaining to the three reference missions, selected for 
their representative coverage of the types of space missions envisioned for the future. From these three 
roadmaps, we have extracted a few common capability patterns that would be appropriate targets for near-
term technical development, one focused on graceful degradation of system functionality, a second 
focused on data understanding for science and engineering applications, and a third focused on hazard 
avoidance and environmental uncertainty. Continuing work is extending these roadmaps to identify 
candidate enablers of the capabilities, from the following three categories: architecture solutions, 
technology solutions, and process solutions. Following the study, future technology planning efforts will 
develop a technical development plan with specific milestones, for specific capability-enabling solutions.  
4.4 Continuing and Future Work 
The relationships and connections made during the study have enabled the study participants to move 
forward with collaborative ideas and proposals. Several participants have already teamed together to 
develop various proposals related to the study, and the co-leads have submitted a KISS Technical 
Development proposal to demonstrate some of the key technologies. These actions are the first of many 
expected steps in creating missions that use truly resilient spacecraft to generate breakthrough science. 
A set of ongoing research and possible future collaborations is described in the following sections. The 
first section describes the follow-on work being proposed through the KISS Technical Development 
program, and the current work to be leveraged by this proposal. The second section describes other 
related research proposals and tasks being developed through other mechanisms. 
4.4.1 KISS Technical Development Proposal 
One promising thrust for future work is discussed in our KISS Technical Development proposal, titled 
“Resilient Space System Architectures: Demonstration of Risk-Aware Hibernation Capabilities using 
Earth-Based Analogues.” The proposal leverages areas of ongoing research at Caltech, MIT, WHOI, and 
JPL. The premise of the proposal and descriptions of areas of research are presented below.  
Spacecraft to support missions described in the Planetary Science Decadal Survey (National Research 
Council, 2011) will need to satisfy a tremendously large number of requirements on resilience. To adapt 
to changes in spacecraft state and changes of the environment, a new class of spacecraft architecture, 
capable of reasoning to predict and avoid hazardous conditions, and recover from internal failures to 
ultimately meet critical science objectives in the presence of substantial uncertainties, is needed.  
A two-year effort will take first steps to develop a highly innovative prototype software architecture, 
deployed as a Resilient Spacecraft Executive, that will endow a spacecraft with unprecedented levels of 
resilience, and then demonstrate how it can reduce risk and cost through capabilities such as highly 
autonomous spacecraft hibernation. This effort builds on and supports research efforts at Caltech, JPL, 
MIT, and WHOI. To achieve these objectives, we will mature and integrate key technologies in (i) goal-
directed and risk-aware execution/decision-making, (ii) correct-by-construction control policy synthesis, 
and (iii) model-based systems engineering approaches that facilitate development and trade studies of the 
underlying architecture. 
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To illustrate the breadth of applicability and versatility of our Resilient Spacecraft Executive architecture, 
we will deploy and demonstrate it on two very different platforms representing compelling Earth-based 
analogues of space systems: 
• An autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) testbed, as an analogue for deep-space missions with 
long hibernation phases (e.g., TTRV); 
• A surface rover testbed, as an analogue to surface missions with long-distance traverses, (e.g., the 
2020 MSM or other future MSR missions). 
The development of the Resilient Spacecraft Executive will leverage substantial ongoing work as 
described below: 
Caltech: Dr. Richard Murray’s group at Caltech has several ongoing, industry-funded projects that were 
well-aligned with the study. They are developing theory and algorithms for model-based verification and 
synthesis of control protocols (Braman, Murray, and Ingham, 2007; Ozay, Topcu, Murray, and 
Wongpiromsarn, 2011; Xu, Topcu, and Murray, 2012). This includes development of specifications for 
desired system behavior and methods for synthesizing control laws to achieve the specified performance. 
The work being done for those other projects will use the proposed architecture and testbeds for 
demonstrations. This will allow the transfer of technologies being developed under external funds to be 
made available to the current project. There are currently four graduate students and two postdocs whose 
work is directly relevant, including two researchers who participated in the KISS study. All ongoing 
projects are nonproprietary and open source. 
JPL: JPL has developed strategic institutional capabilities and expertise in Integrated Model-Centric 
Engineering (IMCE) (Bayer et al., 2010; 2011), which the JPL Engineering and Science Directorate has 
invested over $2M in over the past 3 years, and which builds upon an even greater investment (over 
$40M) over the past decade in MBSE capabilities, including the patented Mission Data System 
technology and the associated State Analysis methodology (Ingham, Rasmussen, Bennett, and Moncada, 
2005). Furthermore, JPL has developed expertise and capability from current autonomy efforts. Most 
significantly, this includes the AEGIS software, which earned the NASA Software of the Year award in 
2011 (Estlin et al., 2012). Finally, JPL has several rover assets, which have been developed over the past 
two decades that post-study efforts can use for proof of concept demonstrations. These include the Field 
Integrated Design and Operations (FIDO) and Athena research rovers, and various simulation and 
hardware-in-the-loop testbeds from the MER project. 
MIT: Dr. Brian Williams’s Model-based Embedded and Robotic Systems (MERS) group at MIT has a 
range of industry and government-funded projects centered on the problem of developing a common 
autonomous control architecture that is resilient, goal-directed, and model-based (Williams, Ingham, 
Chung, and Elliott, 2003; Williams and Ingham, 2002; Williams, Ingham, Chung, Elliott, and Hofbaur, 
2004; Ono and Williams, 2008; Hofbaur and Williams, 2004). These independently supported projects 
are well-aligned to the goals of our study and the follow-on proposal, both with respect to developing a 
risk-aware executive, and a resilient architecture. There are currently four MERS graduate students whose 
work is directly relevant to extending model-based executives to be risk aware, and three additional 
MERS graduate students who are developing model-based execution elements that we will leverage for 
post-study activities. This includes two graduate students who participated in the KISS study. 
WHOI: Dr. Rich Camilli’s research group in WHOI’s Deep Submergence Laboratory (DSL) specializes 
in developing in situ robotic technologies for oceanographic science. DSL is home to the National Deep 
Submergence Facility (NDSF), and develops/maintains/operates a fleet of over a dozen autonomous, 
remotely operated, and human-occupied submersibles (www.whoi.edu/main/ndsf). Camilli’s ongoing 
NASA Astrobiology Science and Technology for Exploring Planets (ASTEP) research program is 
developing autonomous sensing techniques for characterizing environmental chemical indicators of life 
(Kunz et al., 2009), and DSL-MERS research collaborations (via Camilli and Williams) focused on 
advancing autonomy for NDSF submersibles. Camilli’s lab also developed the Sentinel AUV glider 
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platform and mass spectrometer, which are potential platforms for resilience demonstrations. The 
extensive collaboration between oceanographic and space science robotics will facilitate a bidirectional 
knowledge transfer benefiting both research domains. 
4.4.2 Other Tasks and Proposal Concepts  
The study provided motivation and inspiration for various other tasks and proposal concepts. The 
following is a listing of activities identified to date. 
JPL Agile Science Strategic Initiative: David R Thompson will lead a 2014 research task under the Agile 
Science Strategic Initiative (Thompson et al., 2012), a JPL effort to prototype onboard autonomy for 
primitive bodies missions. Capabilities for maturation include dynamic science feature recognition and 
excision of pathological data collection errors, which were both capabilities discussed extensively during 
the workshops. Additionally, he will advise Melissa Bunte, a participant of the second workshop, on a 
new NASA postdoctoral fellowship to take place next year. This research will investigate new methods of 
measuring transient processes during small bodies and outer planets missions. 
JPL NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) Proposal: Principal Investigator (PI) Adrian Stoica 
collaborated with KISS Co-Investigators (Co-Is) Michel Ingham and Leslie Tamppari to submit a NIAC 
proposal titled “TransFormers for Extreme Environments.” The proposal was selected for a NIAC Phase 
1 award. They propose an enabling capability for operation in extreme environments such as permanently 
shadowed craters or planetary caves, a solution applicable to all types of in situ missions, which is to 
project and control a favorable microenvironment (around a rover) in the local area where exploration, 
exploitation, or human visits will take place. The systems that could provide such a capability are called 
TransFormers. The name suggests their two key properties: they transform the environment, and they 
adapt to needs by shape change/transformation. TransFormers are gossamer-thin (~100 microns) and fold 
compactly (~1 cubic meter unfolding to a ~10,000-square-meter area). Their body surface would embed 
reflectors and solar cells; they would also include antenna elements for communication, and actuation and 
control elements for shape change. TransFormers present a novel way of improving survivability in 
extreme environments, and enable new classes of missions, such as operations that involve long periods 
of time without direct solar input or radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), at massively reduced 
cost; missions to polar craters on the Moon and Mercury, or caves on Mars and the Moon would 
particularly benefit, with remote TransFormers providing illumination, energy, and communications. 
JPL Topical Research and Technology Development (R&TD) Proposal Concept: Leonard Reder, PI, 
with Co-Is Cin-Young Lee (JPL) and Professor Tihamér Levendovszky (Institute for Software Integrated 
Systems [ISIS], Vanderbilt University) submitted an R&TD proposal titled “Aspect Oriented 
Programming for Flight Software.” Flight software (FSW) complexity is an ongoing issue for flight 
projects. JPL has partially addressed this complexity by modularizing FSW code along functional lines 
(e.g., device drivers, device managers, etc.). Modularization has resulted in limited success; FSW starts 
out as very clear and easy to understand, however, in the course of development, all kinds of ancillary 
services must be added such as commanding, telemetry, fault protection, and remote diagnostic 
capabilities to log run-time activities. These services are pervasive and impact virtually every part of the 
FSW often resulting in code entanglement and obfuscation in which these pervasive cross-cutting 
concerns cannot be cleanly separated from the basic FSW functionality that use them. Modification of any 
of these services necessitates additional changes across the FSW, reducing maintainability and reusability. 
Aspect-oriented Programming (AOP) is a new programming paradigm that provides abstractions for 
addressing cross cutting concerns. Our goal is to investigate refining FSW using AOP. The objective of 
this R&TD task is to demonstrate that AOP can dramatically simplify FSW by cleanly separating cross 
cutting concerns such as commanding, telemetry processing, fault detection, etc. from the functional code. 
State Outcome Space-Based Spacecraft Fault Protection—JPL Topic Area R&TD Proposal Concept: 
Michael Sievers, PI, with Co-Is Michel Ingham, John Day, and David Bayard (JPL), and Professor Azad 
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Madni (University of Southern California [USC]), submitted a JPL R&TD proposal titled “State Outcome 
Space Based Spacecraft Fault Protection.” Many of JPL’s flight missions must operate robustly in harsh 
and uncertain environments, and these missions will need enhanced capabilities to reconfigure themselves 
in the presence of faults, whether human-induced or the result of environmental stresses. Several past 
systems have encountered unanticipated fault conditions that required extensive ground intervention to 
overcome and in some cases contributed to the system failure. This effort intends to develop a modified 
hidden Markov Model (MHMM) for spacecraft guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) although the 
approach is intended to be equally applicable to all spacecraft and instrument functions. JPL’s state of the 
art depends on up-front identification of faults for devising fault protection measures. In contrast, our 
proposed approach depends on modeling expected behavior and looking for variances from the 
expectation. Specifically, our effort will create a model of states and transitions from known GNC 
architectures (the observable part of the MHMM) while also including hidden states that represent 
uncontrollable and unobservable conditions. This effort will also develop a means for training the model 
(determining the state transition probabilities and the emission probabilities) along with prototype 
software that estimates system state and enables fault diagnosis. In addition, this work will evaluate the 
probability of detecting and diagnosing faults as the primary quantitative metric. 
12th Annual Conference on Systems Engineering Research—“Engineered Resilient Systems: 
Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century” (March 21–22, 2014): The University of Southern 
California in collaboration with the Stevens Institute of Technology presents the 12th Annual Conference 
on Systems Engineering Research. The primary conference objective is to provide practitioners and 
researchers in academia, industry, and government a common platform to present, discuss, and influence 
systems engineering research with the intent to enhance systems engineering practice and education. Two 
of the co-leads of the KISS ERSS study (John Day and Mitch Ingham) are leading a session on 
Autonomous Resiliency Research and Applications, and anticipate participation from other study 
participants. 
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Exploring space is a challenging and difficult endeavor. As the destinations become more challenging and 
science questions more sophisticated, and as mission experience accumulates, the most accessible targets 
are visited and the knowledge frontier advances to more difficult, harsh, and inaccessible environments. 
These space missions will require more resilience in order to perform the desired science in new 
environments, under constraints of development and operations cost, acceptable risk, and communications 
delays. Development of space systems with these capabilities has the potential to revolutionize space 
science, enabling as yet unforeseen missions and breakthrough science observations. 
Our KISS ERSS study provided an essential venue for the consideration of these challenges and goals. 
The study allowed a collection of diverse and engaged engineers, researchers, and scientists to think 
deeply about the theory, approaches, and technical issues involved in developing and applying resilience 
capabilities. The conclusions summarize the varied and disparate discussions that occurred during the 
study, and include new insights about the nature of the challenge and potential solutions: 
1. There is a clear and definitive need for more resilient space systems. During our study period, 
the key scientists/engineers we engaged to understand potential future missions confirmed the 
scientific and risk reduction value of greater resilience in the systems used to perform these 
missions. Through this process, we also refined our understanding of the challenges and needs of 
these potential missions. Several distinct trends will influence space exploration missions in the 
next decade—new destinations with unknown or poorly characterized conditions and hazards, 
multielement missions and multimission campaigns, and long-duration flight. This leads to new 
challenges including: hazardous conditions that limit mission lifetime, such as high radiation 
levels surrounding interesting destinations like Europa or toxic atmospheres of planetary bodies 
like Venus; unconstrained environments with navigation hazards, such as free-floating active 
small bodies; multielement missions required to answer more sophisticated questions, such as 
MSR; and long-range missions that must survive equipment failures over the span of decades, 
such as Kuiper belt exploration. Further, we believe new and unprecedented missions will be 
enabled when we have proven resilience capabilities available for incorporation into system 
designs. Envision the possibilities if we could send vehicles into very hazardous environments 
with the same confidence afforded by present-day missions, or if mission planners and scientists 
could count on good science return, even when operators cannot be in the loop.  
2. Resilience can be quantified in measurable terms—project cost, mission risk, and quality of 
science return. In order to consider resilience properly in the set of engineering trades performed 
during the design, integration, and operation of space systems, the benefits and costs of resilience 
need to be quantified. We believe, based on the work done during the study, that appropriate 
metrics to measure resilience must relate to risk, cost, and science quality/opportunity. As these 
become more specific and concrete, the risk and opportunity cost can be weighed in design 
trades. Just as current spacecraft and rovers use fault protection to reduce the risk of component 
failures, future vehicles will apply characteristics to increase resilience in the system design. 
Many possible metrics for quantifying resilience were discussed during the study, but additional 
work is necessary to evolve and mature these preliminary ideas. Future work in developing 
metrics will build upon the definition of resilience established in the study and experience of 
projects beginning to apply related metrics in current design trades (e.g., NASA’s Space Launch 
System). In the end, these metrics need to clearly convey the value proposition of resilience; once 
the costs and benefits can be articulated, the considerations associated with resilience will become 
as familiar as current trades of mass and power.  
3. There are many existing basic technologies that can be applied to engineering resilient space 
systems. The many benefits of bringing together a diverse set of professionals include the wide 
range of knowledge that is exposed in the process. Through the discussions during the study, we 
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found many different approaches and multiple thrusts of research that are addressing various 
facets of resilience, some within NASA, and many more beyond. Examples from civil 
architecture, DoD/DARPA initiatives (e.g., Adaptive Vehicle Make, Engineered Resilient 
Systems), ‘smart’ power grid control, cyber-physical systems, software architecture, and 
application of formal verification methods for software broadened and enriched the discussion. 
The variety and scope of related efforts is encouraging and presents many opportunities for 
collaboration and development, and we expect many collaborative proposals and joint research as 
a result of the study. The problem is difficult enough that there is a need to cooperate with other 
researchers in the same and related domains to bootstrap efforts. However, a lack of a common 
conceptual foundation hinders technology integration and adoption. As an example, certain 
capabilities that are prerequisites for autonomous resilience exist in different fields (machine 
learning, data analytics, controls, fault detection and isolation, planning and artificial intelligence, 
etc.), but we currently lack the understanding of how to fit technology pieces together into an 
integrated system. An approach is needed to figure out how to effectively integrate resilience-
related capabilities and technologies in coherent system architectures.  
4. Use of principled architectural approaches are key for managing complexity and 
integrating disparate technologies. The main challenge inherent in considering highly resilient 
space systems is that the increase in capability can result in an increase in complexity, with all of 
the risks and costs associated with more complex systems. What is needed is a better way of 
conceiving space systems that enables incorporation of capabilities without increasing 
complexity. We believe principled architecting approaches provide the needed means to convey a 
unified understanding of the system to primary stakeholders, thereby controlling complexity in 
the conception and development of resilient systems, and enabling the integration of disparate 
approaches and technologies. There is a strong need for the development of a formal framework 
for making architectural tradeoff decisions between passive (inherent in design) and active 
resilience, reflexive, habitual and deliberative behavior, and appropriate allocation of function to 
architectural layers and system elements. We believe the successful application of principled 
architecture to future NASA missions will enable the development of robust and efficient 
missions with dramatic reductions in cost and risk. More capable spacecraft can be conceived and 
deployed, expanding the frontiers of exploration and autonomy. Significant research into the 
theory behind such a framework is needed, as are means for articulating the resulting principles 
and application to system designs, but this work will lead to a fundamental change in how 
complex space systems are developed and operated, with similar benefits for systems beyond the 
spacecraft domain. A representative architectural example is included in Appendix F. 
5. Developing trusted resilience capabilities will require a diverse yet strategically directed 
research program. Despite the interest in, and benefits of, deploying resilience space systems, to 
date, there has been a notable lack of meaningful demonstrated progress in systems capable of 
working in hazardous uncertain situations. The roadmaps completed during the study, and 
documented in this report, provide the basis for a real funded plan that considers the required 
fundamental work and evolution of needed capabilities. The study allowed exploration of needs 
and capabilities, and possible technologies and solutions. This exploration has elicited key ideas, 
including architecture, robust control, planning and reasoning, and V&V approaches, that will be 
explored in the proposals and collaborations resulting from the study. We need better models and 
better integration of our models to accomplish our goals; with our current techniques and tools, 
achieving even the lowest-hanging fruits of resilient systems has been VERY labor intensive—it 
is clear that our methodologies have to change in order to move forward. Research investment is 
needed to advance resilience engineering theory and fund the needed development of capabilities, 
methods, and tools. Furthermore, a path for infusion of these capabilities, methods, and tools is 
critical; we believe challenging yet credible technology demonstrations are a key step for 
infusion—not just simulations and laboratory work, but also field testing and use of existing 
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NASA spacecraft that are beyond their original and extended mission (e.g., the Kepler 
spacecraft).  
 
 39 
6.0 REFERENCES 
 
5th International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems (SERENE 2013). Retrieved 
November 25, 2013, from http://serene.uni.lu/Workshops/SERENE_2013/Call_For_Papers. 
Alderson, D. L., and Doyle, J. C. (2010). Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their Implications for 
Network-Centric Infrastructures. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics—Part A: 
Systems and Humans, 40(4), 839–852. 
ARINC. (2013). Avionics Application Software Standard Interface. ARINC 653. 
Bayer, T. J., et al. (2010). An Operations Concept for Integrated Model-Centric Engineering at JPL. 2010 
IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, March 6–13, 2010. 
Bayer, T. J., et al. (2011). Update – Concept of Operations for Integrated Model-Centric Engineering at 
JPL. 2011 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, March 5–12, 2011. 
Benton, J., Coles, A. J., and Coles A. I. (2012). Temporal Planning with Preferences and Time-Dependent 
Continuous Costs. ICAPS 2012. 
Bernard, D. E., et al. (1998). Design of the Remote Agent Experiment for Spacecraft Autonomy. 1998 
IEEE Aerospace Conference, Aspen, CO, March 21–28, 1998. 
Blum, A. L., and Furst, M. L. (1997). Fast Planning Through Planning Graph Analysis. Artificial 
Intelligence, 90(1–2), 281–300. 
Borucki, W. J., et al. (2011). Characteristics of Planetary Candidates Observed by Kepler, II: Analysis of 
the First Four Months of Data. The Astrophysical Journal, 736(1). 
Bradski, G., and Kaehler, A. (2008). Learning OpenCV: Computer Vision with the OpenCV Library. 
Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media. 
Braman, J. M. B., Murray, R. M., and Ingham, M. D. (2007). Verification Procedure for Generalized 
Goal-Based Control Programs. 2007 AIAA Infotech@Aerospace Conference and Exhibit, Rohnert 
Park, CA, May 7–10, 2007. 
Brown, O. and Eremenko, P. (2006). Fractionated Space Architectures: A Vision for Responsive Space. 
Proceedings of the AIAA 4th Responsive Space Conference, Los Angeles, CA, April 24–27, 2006. 
AIAA-RS4-2006-1002. 
Buckley, B. and Vangaasbeck, J. (1994). SCL: An Off-The-Shelf System for Spacecraft Control. Space 
Mission Operations and Ground Data Systems, 1, 559–568. 
Byers, C. M., Cheng, B. H., and McKinley, P. K. (2011). Digital Enzymes: Agents of Reaction Inside 
Robotic Controllers for the Foraging Problem. Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Genetic and 
Evolutionary Computation Conference, Dublin, Ireland, 243–250. 
Castano, R., et al. (2006). Opportunistic Rover Science: Finding and Reacting to Rocks, Clouds, and Dust 
Devils. 2006 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, March 4–11, 2006. 
Cheng, Y., Johnson, A., and Matthies, L. (2005). MER-DIMES: A Planetary Landing Application of 
Computer Vision. 2005 IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern 
Recognition (CPRV 2005), 1, 806–813. 
Chien, S., Knight, R., Stechert, A., Sherwood, R., and Rabideau, G. (1999). Using Iterative Repair to 
Increase the Responsiveness of Planning and Scheduling for Autonomous Spacecraft. International 
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 99), Stockholm, Sweden. 
 40 
Chien, S., et al. (2005). Using Autonomy Flight Software to Improve Science Return on Earth Observing 
One. Journal of Aerospace Computing, Information, and Communication, 2, 196–216. 
Christopher, M., and Peck, H. (2004). Building the Resilient Supply Chain. International Journal of 
Logistics Management, 15(2), 1–14. 
Coles, A. I., Fox, M., Halsey, K., Long, D., and Smith, A. (2009). Managing Concurrency in Temporal 
Planning Using Planner-Scheduler Interaction. Artificial Intelligence, 173(1), 1–44. 
Coles, A. J., Coles, A. I., Fox, M., and Long, D. (2011). LPRPG: A Planner for Metric Resources. The 
2011 International Planning Competition, 58. 
Coles, A. J., Coles, A. I., Fox, M., and Long, D. (2012). COLIN: Planning with Continuous Linear 
Numeric Change. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 44, 1–96. 
Conroy, M., Mazzone, R., and Lin, W. (2013). NASA Integrated Model-Centric Architecture (NIMA) 
Model Use and Re-Use. 2013 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, March 2–9, 2013. 
DARPA Tactical Technology Office. (n.d.). META. Retrieved November 25, 2013, from 
http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/Programs/AVM/AVM_Design_Tools_(META).aspx. 
Doyle, J. C., and Csete, M. (2011). Architecture, Constraints, and Behavior. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science, 108(Supplement 3), 15624–15630. 
DSN 1st Workshop on Systems Resilience (WSR 2013). Retrieved November 25, 2013, from 
http://systemsresilience.org/wsr2013/wsr2013.html. 
Dvorak, D. (Ed.). (2009). NASA Study on Flight Software Complexity. Final Report submitted to NASA 
Office of Chief Engineer. 
Epp, C. D., Robertson, E. A., and Brady, T. (2008). Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance 
Technology (ALHAT). 2008 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, March 1–8, 2008. 
Esposito, L. W. (n.d.). Mission Concept: Venus In Situ Explorer (VISE). White paper to the 2013 
Decadal Survey Inner Planets Panel. 
Estlin, T., et al. (2012). AEGIS Automated Targeting for the MER Opportunity Rover. ACM 
Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, 3(3), 50. 
Feiler, P. H., and Gluch, D. P. (2012). Model-Based Engineering with AADL: A Introduction to the SAE 
Architecture Analysis and Design Language. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Fesq., L., Fretz, K., and Newhouse, M. (2013). Report on the 2012 NASA Spacecraft Fault Management 
Workshop. Final Report submitted to the NASA Science Mission Directorate. 
Frank, J., Jónsson, A., Morris, R., and Smith, D. E. (2001). Planning and Scheduling for Fleets of Earth 
Observing Satellites. Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence, 
Robotics, Automation and Space. 
Garlan, D., Cheng, S. W., Huang, A. C., Schmerl, B., and Steenkiste, P. (2004). Rainbow: Architecture-
Based Self-Adaptation with Reusable Infrastructure. IEEE Computer, 37(10), 46–54. 
Gat, E. (1997). ESL: A Language for Supporting Robust Plan Execution in Embedded Autonomous 
Agents. Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 1, 319–324. 
Gehrels, N., et al. (2004). The Swift Gamma-Ray Burst Mission. The Astrophysical Journal, 611(2), 
1005–1020. 
Gerhart, J., and Kirschner, M. (2007). The Theory of Facilitated Variation. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 104(Suppl. 1), 8582–8589. 
 41 
Goldberg, S. B., Maimone, M. W., and Matthies, L. (2002). Stereo Vision and Rover Navigation 
Software for Planetary Exploration. Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 5, 2025–
2036. 
Goldsby, H. J., Cheng, B. H., McKinley, P. K., Knoester, D. B., and Ofria, C. A. (2008). Digital 
Evolution of Behavioral Models for Autonomic Systems. 2008 International Conference on 
Autonomic Computing, 87–96. 
Grasso, C. A. (2002). The Fully Programmable Spacecraft: Procedural Sequencing for JPL Deep Space 
Mission Using VML (Virtual Machine Language). Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, 1, 75–81. 
Harel, D. (1987). Statecharts: A Visual Formalism for Complex Systems. Science of Computer 
Programming, 8(3), 231–274. 
Hayati, S., et al. (2007). Advanced Robotics Technology Infusion to the NASA Mars Exploration Rover 
(MER) Project. 6th IFAC Symposium on Intelligent Autonomous Vehicles, Toulouse, France. 
Heinecke, H., et al. (2004). AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture – An Industry-Wide Initiative to 
Manage the Complexity of Emerging Automotive E/E-Architectures. Convergence, 325–332. 
Helmert, M. (2006). The Fast Downward Planning System. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 
26(1), 191–246. 
Hofbaur, M. W., and Williams, B. C. (2004). Hybrid Estimation of Complex Systems. IEEE Transactions 
on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics - Part B: Cybernetics, Special Issue on Diagnosis in Complex 
Systems: Bridging the Methodologies of the FDI and DX Communities, 34(5), 2178–2191. 
Hoffmann, J. (2001). FF: The Fast-Forward Planning System. AI Magazine, 22(3), 57. 
Holzmann, G. J. (1997). The Model Checker SPIN. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 23(5), 
279–295. 
Hsu, C.W., Wah, B.W., Huang, R., and Chen, Y. (2006). Handling Soft Constraints and Goals 
Preferences in SGPlan. Proceedings of the ICAPS Workshop on Preferences and Soft Constraints in 
Planning, June 2006. 
Ingham, M. D., Rasmussen, R. D., Bennett, M. B, and Moncada, A. C. (2005). Engineering Complex 
Embedded Systems with State Analysis and the Mission Data System. Journal of Aerospace 
Computing, Information, and Communication, 2, 507–536. 
Jansma, P.A. (2011). Open! Open! Open! Galileo High Gain Antenna Anomaly Workarounds. 2011 IEEE 
Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, March 5–12, 2011. 
Jones, R. M. (2003). Surface and Atmosphere Geochemical Explorer (SAGE) baseline design from 
March 2003 Team X studies. 38th Vernadsky/Brown Microsymposium on Comparative Planetology, 
Moscow, Russia, October 27–29, 2003. 
Kautz, H., and Selman, B. (1999). Unifying SAT-based Graph-based Planning. Proceedings of the 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99), Stockholm, Sweden. 
Kirschner, M. and Gerhart, J. (2005).  The Plausibility of Life: Resolving Darwin’s Dilemma. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Kubitschek, D. G., et al. (2007). The Challenges of Deep Impact Autonomous Navigation. Journal of 
Field Robotics, 24(4), 339–354. 
Kunz, C., et al. (2009). Toward Extraplanetary Under-Ice Exploration: Robotic Steps in the Artic. Journal 
of Field Robotics, 26(4), 411–429. 
 42 
Lyke, J. (2007). Space-Plug-and-Play Avionics (SPA): A Three-Year Progress Report. AIAA 
Infotech@Aerospace 2007 Conference and Exhibit, Rohnert Park, CA, May 7–10, 2007. 
Maier, M.W., and Rechtin, E. (2009), The Art of Systems Architecting, 3rd ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press. 
Malone, M. (2009). OPERA RHBD Multi-Core. Presentation at Military and Aerospace Programmable 
Logic Devices Workshop (MAPLD). August 31, 2009. 
Mankins, J. C. (1995). Technology Readiness Levels: A White Paper. NASA Office of Space Access and 
Technology. 
Mattingly, R., and May, L. (2011). Mars Sample Return as a Campaign. 2011 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, Big Sky, MT, March 5–12, 2011. 
Model Checking. (n.d.) In Wikipedia, Retrieved November 25, 2013, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_checking 
Morgan, M. J. (1991). Integrated Modular Avionics for Next-Generation Commercial Airplanes. 
Proceedings of the IEEE 1991 National Aerospace and Electronic Conference (NEACON 1991), 1, 
43–49. 
Murray, R. M., Ingham, M. D., Day, J. C., Williams, B. C., and Reder, L. J. (2012). Retrieved on 
December 3, 2013 from http://www.kiss.caltech.edu/study/systems. 
Muscettola, N., Nayak, P. P., Pell, B., and Williams, B. C. (1998). Remote Agent: To Boldly Go Where 
No AI System Has Gone Before. Artificial Intelligence, 103(1–2), 5–47. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2010a). Venus Intrepid Tessera Lander: Mission 
Concept Study Report to the NRC Decadal Survey Inner Planets Panel. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2010b). Mission Concept Study: Planetary Science 
Decadal Survey—Trojan Tour Decadal Study. NASA SDO-12348. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2010c). Mission Concept Study: Planetary Science 
Decadal Survey—MSR Orbiter Mission (Including Mars Returned Sample Handling). 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2010d). Mission Concept Study: Planetary Science 
Decadal Survey—MSR Lander Mission. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2012). Fault Management Handbook, Draft 2. NASA-
HDBK-1002. 
National Research Council. (2003). New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration 
Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 
National Research Council. (2011). Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013–2022, 
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 
Neches, R. and Madni, A. M. (2012). Towards Affordably Adaptable and Effective Systems. Systems 
Engineering, 16(2), 224–234. 
Nemeth, C., Wears, R., Woods, D., Hollnagel, E., and Cook, R. (2008). Minding the Gaps: Creating 
Resilience in Health Care. Advances in Patient Safety: New Directions and Alternative Approaches, 
3, 259–271. 
Object Management Group. (OMG). (2007). Data Distribution Service for Real-time Systems, Version 
1.2. January 2007. 
Object Management Group. (OMG). (2011). OMG Unified Modeling Language (OMG UML), 
Infrastructure, Version 2.4.1. August 2011. 
 43 
Ofria, C., and Wilke, C. O. (2004). Avida: A Software Platform for Research in Computational 
Evolutionary Biology. Artificial Life, 10(2), 191–229. 
Ono, M., and Williams, B. C. (2008). Iterative Risk Allocation: A New Approach to Robust Model 
Predictive Control with a Joint Chance Constraint. Proceedings of 47th IEEE Conference on Decision 
and Control (CDC), 3427–3432. 
Ozay, N., Topcu, U., Murray, R. M., and Wongpiromsarn, T. (2011). Distributed Synthesis of Control 
Protocols for Smart Camera Networks. ACM/IEEE 2nd International Conference on Cyber-Physical 
Systems, 45–54. 
Penberthy, J. S., and Weld, D. S. (1992). UCPOP: A Sound, Complete, Partial-Order Planner for ADL. 
Third International Conference on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-92), 103–114. 
Quigley, M., et al. (2009). ROS: An Open-Source Robot Operating System. ICRA Workshop on Open 
Source Software, 3(2). 
Rabideau, G., Knight, R., Chien, S., Fukunaga, A., and Govindjee, A. (1999). Iterative Repair Planning 
for Spacecraft Operations in the ASPEN System. International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence 
Robotics and Automation in Space, Noodwijk, The Netherlands, June 1999. 
Rayman, M. D., and Varghese, P. (2001). The Deep Space 1 Extended Mission. Acta Astronautica, 48(5–
12), 693–705. 
Rayman, M. D., Varghese, P., Lehman, D. H., and Livesay, L. L. (2000). Results from the Deep Space 1 
Technology Validation Mission. Acta Astronautica, 47(2–9), 475–487. 
Rouquette, N. F., Neilson, T., and Chen, G. (1999). The 13th Technology of Deep Space One. 
Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 1, 477–487. 
Runtime Verification. (n.d.) Retrieved November 25, 2013, from http://runtime-verification.org. 
Saranli, U., Buehler, M. and Koditschek, D. E. (2001). RHex: A Simple and Highly Mobile Hexapod 
Robot. The International Journal of Robotic Research, 20(7), 616–631. 
Simon, H. A. (1962). The Architecture of Complexity. Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, 106(6), 467–482. 
Spirit (rover). (n.d.) In Wikipedia, Retrieved November 25, 2013, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirit_rover. 
Thompson, D. R., et al. (2012). Agile Science Operations: A New Approach for Primitive Bodies 
Explorations. Proceedings of the SpaceOps 2012 Conference, Stockholm, Sweden, June 11–15, 2012. 
Volpe, R., et al. (2001). The CLARAty Architecture for Robotic Autonomy. Proceedings of the 2001 
IEEE Aerospace Conference, 1, 121–132. 
Wang, D., and Williams, B. C. (2014). Using Timed Automata to Model Machine Coordination. 
Submitted to ICAPS 2014. 
Whelan, D. A., Adler, E. A., Wilson, S. B., and Roesler, G. (2000). DARPA Orbital Express Program: 
Effecting a Revolution in Space-Based Systems. Small Payloads in Space, 136, 48–56. 
Williams, B. C. and Ingham, M. D. (2002). Model-Based Programming: Controlling Embedded Systems 
by Reasoning About Hidden State. 8th International Conference on Principles and Practice of 
Constraint Programming (CP-02), Ithaca, NY, September 2002. 
Williams, B. C., Ingham, M. D., Chung, S. H., and Elliott, P. H. (2003). Model-Based Programming of 
Intelligent Embedded Systems and Robotic Space Explorers. Proceedings of the IEEE, Special Issue 
on Modeling and Design of Embedded Software, 91(1), 212–237. 
 44 
Williams, B. C., Ingham, M. D., Chung, S. H., Elliott, P. H., and Hofbaur, M. (2004). Model-based 
Programming of Fault-Aware Systems. AI Magazine, 24(4), 61–75. 
Williams, B. C., and Nayak, P. P. (1996). A Model-Based Approach to Reactive Self-Configuring 
Systems. Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 971–978. 
Williams, B. C., and Nayak, P. P. (1997). A Reactive Planner for Model-based Executive. Proceedings of 
the 15th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 97), 1178–1185. 
Wongpiromsarn, T., Topcu, U., and Murray, R. M. (2010). Automatic Synthesis of Robust Embedded 
Control Software. AIAA Spring Symposium on Embedded Reasoning: Intelligence in Embedded Systems. 
Woods, M., et al. (2008). Crest Autonomous Robotic Scientist: Developing a Closed-Loop Science 
Exploration Capability for European Mars Missions. i-SAIRAS: International Symposium on Artificial 
Intelligence, Robotics and Automation in Space, Hollywood, USA. 
Xu, H., Topcu, U., and Murray, R. M. (2012). A Case Study on Reactive Protocols for Aircraft Electric 
Power Distribution. 2012 IEEE 51st Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 1124–1129. 
 
 45 
APPENDIX A: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS 
 
 46 
APPENDIX B: WORKSHOP AGENDAS 
Workshop #1 
 
 47 
 
 48 
 
 49 
 
 50 
 
 51 
Workshop #2 
 
 
 52 
APPENDIX C: FOCUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
Architecture Focus Group Membership (in alphabetical order): 
Kenneth Donahue, JPL 
John Doyle, Caltech 
Tara Estlin, JPL 
Kim Gostelow, JPL 
Mitch Ingham, JPL 
Joseph Kochocki, C.S. Draper Lab 
Robert Rasmussen, JPL 
Janos Sztipanovits, Vanderbilt U. 
David Wang, MIT 
Huan Xu, Caltech 
In addition to these core members, participants Richard Camilli (WHOI) and Howie Shrobe 
(MIT/DARPA) joined the discussions at the second workshop. 
Reference Mission Focus Group Membership (in alphabetical order): 
George Cancro, JHU APL 
John Day, JPL 
Tara Estlin, JPL  
Lorraine Fesq, JPL 
Necmiye Ozay, Caltech 
Leslie Tamppari, JPL 
David Thompson, JPL 
Brian Williams, MIT 
Capabilities Focus Group Membership (in alphabetical order): 
Ella Atkins, University of Michigan 
Erv Baumann, NGAS 
Betty Cheng, Michigan State 
Azad Madni, USC 
Richard Murray, Caltech 
Len Reder, JPL 
Abhinav Saxena, Ames 
Eric Timmons, MIT 
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APPENDIX D: DEFINITIONS OF RESILIENCE 
This appendix includes many of the definitions of resilience referenced, proposed, or discussed during the 
study. 
Ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so 
that it can sustain required operations, even after a major mishap or in the presence of continuous stress 
(Nemeth, Wears, Woods, Hollnagel, and Cook,, 2008) 
Ability of a system to adapt affordably and perform effectively across a wide range of operational 
contexts, where context is defined by mission, environment, threat, and force disposition (Neches and 
Madni, 2012) 
Ability of a system to return to its original state or move to a new, more desirable state after being 
disturbed (Christopher and Peck, 2004) 
Ability of a of a system to achieve envisioned (science) objectives even if the system (spacecraft) 
performance and/or environment are not as expected (Murray, Ingham, Day, Williams, and Reder, 2012) 
Ability of a system to offer broad utility in a wide range of operations across many potential alternative 
futures despite experiencing disruptions (A. Madni) 
Resilience: a [property] of a [system] is resilient if it can [recover] with respect to a set of [perturbations]. 
(David Wang, using a variation on David L Alderson and John C Doyle (2010) definition of robustness. 
Where system—a grouping of components, i.e. the entire space mission, just the spacecraft, the 
communications subsystem; property—a function or objective of a system; perturbations—
disturbances/failures/noise) 
Resilience is defined as “establishing the goals of anticipate, withstand, recover, and evolve.” (Aerospace, 
via Fesq) 
“A resilient system is a system that can, in the face of unknown, large-scale events, recover from the 
failures and maintain its functions.” (DSN 1st Workshop on System Resilience, 2013) 
A resilient system can figure out what to do in the presence of anomalies and discoveries (Gentry Lee) 
Resilience is adaptation when assumptions do not pan out. (D. Thompson) 
Resilience: goal-directed behavior in an uncertain environment. (R. Rasmussen) 
Resilient systems provide a high likelihood of mission success and a high rate of return, despite 
environmental conditions and mission goals that are highly uncertain and that change dynamically. (Brian 
Williams) 
Resilience: “an ability of the system to persistently deliver its services in a trustworthy way even when 
facing changes, unforeseen failures and intrusions” (5th Int. Workshop on Software Engineering for 
Resilient Systems SERENE 2013, 2013) 
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APPENDIX E: SUMMARY OF REFERENCE MISSIONS CONSIDERED 
The Reference Mission Focus Group desired to gain insight into the specific resilience needs of potential 
future missions. We interviewed scientists and/or engineers (see Scientists/Engineers Interviewed below) 
who are working closely with each of the mission concepts that we chose out of the Decadal Survey. In 
preparation for the interview, we developed a set of potential questions designed to elicit the resilience 
needs of the mission (see Interview/Questions below).  
After the interviews, we downselected to four reference missions to be further examined and discussed 
during Workshop #2. The four reference missions chosen were: Venus Lander, MSR, TTRV, and the 
Interstellar Probe. The first three represent varied needs. The Venus Lander highlights the importance of 
rapid and onboard mission replanning, onboard assessment and prioritized downlink of data, graceful 
degradation on components, and the ability to continue to achieve science goals during component or 
system degradation and failure. The MSR mission represents rapid mission planning and replanning, and 
highlights the resilience needs of a set of spacecraft that all must work to achieve the end goal. The TTRV 
mission highlights the challenges associated with long duration cruise, rapid science analysis and 
observation replanning, and the need to continue to take science observations even if components or 
systems are suboptimal. The last mission, Interstellar Probe, represents a mission that is far in the future, 
and encompassing all of the challenges represented by the former three missions, such that it was a useful 
test case for understanding if the technology capabilities and architecture concepts discussed would be 
applicable to future missions.  
Scientists/Engineers Interviewed 
Mission Person(s) Interviewed Date 
Venus Lander/MRO Dr. Sue Smrekar 11/20/12 
Titan Balloon Dr. Christophe Sotin 11/27/12 
MSL Dr. Joy Crisp 11/27/12 
Venus Balloon Dr. Kevin Baines 12/4/12 
Europa Mission Dr. Dave Senske and Brian Cooke 12/18/12 
Trojan Asteroid Rendezvous Dr. Julie Castillo-Rogez 12/19/12 
Mars Sample Return Erik Nilsen 2/13/13 
Interstellar Probe Gentry Lee 1/2/13 
Comet Surface Sample Return Dr. Carol Raymond 1/27/13 
Interview Questions 
General: 
1. What capability would reduce the risk to your mission (science)? 
2. What capability would reduce the cost of your mission (science)? 
3. What would your concerns be with a system that has more autonomous capability (or X 
capability)? 
4. What do you think are the largest obstacles in performing your mission and getting science 
return? 
5. “If I only had ‘X’ everything would be better.” What is “X?” 
6. What would be enabled in your mission if you had X capability? How would your mission 
change if you had this? 
Specific: 
1. What would be the value to your mission (or science return or health and safety) if you had a 
system that could react to time-varying phenomena autonomously? 
2. What would be the value to your mission (or science return or health and safety) if you could 
recognize and avoid environmental hazards? 
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3. What would be the value to your mission (or science return or health and safety) if you had next-
generation onboard processing? And what specifically would you like to see done with that? 
4. What would be the value to your mission (or science return or health and safety) if you had highly 
efficient operations? And what specifically does that mean to you? 
5. In your opinion, what kinds of decisions should be kept in the realm of the scientists and what 
kinds should be in the realm of the robotic system? 
Final Questions: 
1. Of the things we’ve talked about, which technology would you like to see pursued? 
2. Is there anything else you think we should be considering or anything else you’d like us to know 
about your mission? 
Needed Capabilities for Reference Missions 
Capability)scoring Strong/enabling Significant Weaker
ID Name Mission,Type Interview Workshop,Use
Rapid,Mission,
Planning
Data,Processing Graceful,
Degradation
Low,Cost,Cruise
1 Venus)Lander)(e.g.,)INTREPID,)SAGE) Harsh)environment)lander S.)Smrekar Workshop)exercise X X X X
2 Venus)Aerial)Mission) InPsitu)aerial)explorer K.)Baines Context X X X X
3 Titan)Aerial)Explorer InPsitu)aerial)explorer C.)Sotin Context X X X X
4 Mars)Sample)Return)(set)of)missions) Landed)rover J.)Crisp)(MSL) Workshop)exercise X X X X
5 Orbiter)"style")(MRO,)Cassini) MultiPtasking)orbiter S.)Smrekar Context X X X
6 Trojan)Tour)and)Rendezvous Small)body)tour J.)CastilloPRogez Workshop)exercise X X X X
7 Europa)Clipper Repeated)HighPvalue)flyby B.)Cooke,)D.)
Senske
Context X X
8 Interstellar)Probe Distant,)longPduration)
explorer
G.)Lee Context X X
9 Insterstellar)Rendezvous Distant,)longPduration)
explorer
G.)Lee Technology)
evolution)check
X X X X
10 Comet)Surface)Sample)Return Sample)Return n/a Context X X X
Needed,Capabilities
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Selected Mission Summaries 
Venus Lander Reference Mission Summary 
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Mars Sample Return Reference Mission Summary 
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Trojan Tour and Rendezvous Reference Mission Summary 
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Interstellar Probe Reference Mission Summary 
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APPENDIX F: ARCHITECTURE FOR RESILIENCE—A REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLE 
Figure F-1 shows a spacecraft software system organized 
in a hierarchy of processes. The top process is the overall 
master process (sometimes referred to as a ‘sequencer’ or 
an ‘executive’) that tells the systems what to do, what to 
accomplish, or how to behave, for the current phase of the 
mission. This kind of architecture is common. The domain 
of discourse for all the estimators and controllers in this 
software system is also the usual things: sensor readings, 
attitude estimate, commanded pointing direction, 
telemetry buffer space available, temperatures, etc. In 
addition, there are models of some of the onboard 
spacecraft devices. The attitude control system (ACS) will 
have gyro models, thruster models, etc. In addition, the 
telemetry system will have a model of its buffers to 
determine when a buffer is full, a model of its switches 
and coax connections to enable it to move from one 
transmitter to another, etc. Some of these models may be 
considerably more sophisticated than the others, but they are models nonetheless. The domain of 
discourse of these models is that of the behavior of the system under control and the environment. We 
will call this spacecraft software system and its associated domains of discourse, the base control system. 
A resilient spacecraft will have a larger domain of discourse, and while some items are the same as in the 
base control system, there will be higher level entities in its vocabulary. We try and separate these domains, 
that is, the domain of the base system, and the domain of the additional resilience meta-control component. 
Looked at as a control system, the resilience meta-control component will have estimators and controllers 
whose domain of discourse is not a sensor reading, current attitude, and the like, as that is the domain of the 
base control system. Rather, the domain of discourse of the resilience meta-control component is ACS 
performance, a measure of how well the ACS system, given the current sensors, actuators, models, and 
estimators, etc., is doing the required job. Performance may include the power being used, say, to run the 
sensors and actuators. The job of the resilience unit is to estimate this performance and to control the ACS 
subsystem to achieve the performance desired. Consider a case where power expended is too large and is 
determined to be the cause of performance falling below the control point. The resilience controller may 
decide to change the sensors, estimators, and controllers, and actuators of the ACS system to an arrangement 
that improves performance, perhaps by using 
less accurate (but good enough) gyros that use 
less power to do the job. 
The resilience meta-control component 
controls the ACS system not by using terms 
from the base system domain but by 
manipulating terms from the resilience 
domain. Figure F-2 illustrates the idea. In 
Figure F-2, the base control system exists and 
does its usual job running the spacecraft. But 
there is another control system, the resilience 
meta-control system, responsible for adjusting 
the base control system by working with, 
modifying, changing, and indeed controlling 
how the base control system is put together. 
The resilience system will need models also, 
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and its models will be of the ACS system—the devices used, how they are wired, the switches, etc., all 
the things necessary to build an ACS system. The resilience meta-control component also controls the 
software and how it is put together. Its models in this case are of the functions the software performs, how 
fast it needs to run, and how to hook things up. But if we design a good resilience meta-control system, 
the rules for how to hook things up are not developed by following rote lists of components to be put 
together, but rather by running models and synthesizers that find their way through arbitrary components, 
hard and soft. In fact, an idealized resilience meta-control system would start with nothing but the 
components and put the spacecraft together from scratch, given a description of what they do and what 
they need. 
Finally, the resilience meta-control component shown in Figure F-2 is shown as a standalone element, but 
just as the base system has a hierarchy of controllers, so will the resilience meta-control system. However, 
the two systems are distinct, each with a different hierarchy. 
It should be noted that some of those things estimated and controlled by the base system and the 
resilience meta-control system have overlap, and in some cases it may be hard to decide which goes 
where. For example, some current base control systems decide when to replace a failed gyro with another. 
Our argument would be that such behavior belongs to the meta-system, not to the base system. The two 
systems work with different things, and it is a good idea to separate them when possible.  
Of course, there are many more elements needed to build a resilient system, but domain of discourse 
might be a useful principle in a finished architecture. Also, note that the ideas presented here are in the 
extreme. For example, the base control system and resilience meta-control system represented 
orthogonally in Figure F-2, would likely cooperate in some way, but the less cooperation needed, the 
better.  
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APPENDIX G: DETAILED REPORT OF CAPABILITIES FOCUS GROUP OUTCOMES 
The goal of the capabilities survey was to look at existing capabilities and formulate lists of the following: 
• Enabling software and autonomy technologies (e.g., middleware, languages, frameworks, etc.) 
• Key processes for agile and verifiable development enabling resilient system development and 
management of complexity 
To achieve these goals, we started with a series of one-hour teleconferences, which led to several 
presentations being given at JPL. A single all-day meeting was held at Caltech to capture a broad set of 
capabilities. Since capabilities are such a broad subject, there is no way we could deal with everything in 
this limited time. We surveyed the Capabilities Focus Group and developed the following set areas of 
interest: 
• SW design patterns, DSLs, models for software synthesis, and automated testing, standards 
• Autonomy patterns, AI planners, self-adaptive software 
• FDIR patterns 
• Technologies taken from other domains (e.g., automotive manned air craft, UAV, UUV, etc.) 
These areas where selected based on the group’s expertise and interests. Based on these areas of interest, 
the following sections were derived and we report a summary of our discussions here. Details of the 
capabilities are captured in the “Capabilities Subgroup: Capabilities (and Architectures) Outbrief,” 26 
Feb. 2013 (www.kiss.caltech.edu/workshops/systems2013/index.html) as presented by co-lead Leonard 
Reder. In the following, we summarize the key discussions that came out of this effort. 
Capabilities   Architectures: Latent vs. Active 
Initially, we discussed the relationship between capabilities and architecture (Figure G-1). The initial 
question is: “Do capabilities drive architecture or does architecture drive capabilities?” Although there 
was no consensus, some insights concerning the notions of latent or passive resilience versus active 
resilience were noted. 
Active resilience is analogous to reflexes triggered by specific disturbances. In the power grid, for 
example, the feature of ‘on-the-fly routing’ is providing active resilience. In the human body, most of 
what we’re good at are automatic and unconscious reflex reactions that we classify as active resilient 
capability. For example, when we are young, we learn to rapidly pull away from touching something 
hot—active resilience toward avoiding a burn.  
Engineering Resilient
s y s t e m s
Capabilities ! Architecture 
•  Relationships Capabilities ! Architecture 
–  Do capabilities drive architecture or does architecture 
drive capabilities? 
 
•  Latent resilience: Ability to withstand impact of 
unexpected system conditions or erosion that 
result from latent conditions (Solutions: culture, 
processes, and technology infrastructures) 
 
•  Active resilience: Ability to circumvent failure and 
adapt to changing science objectives (Solutions: 
FDIR, Autonomy, etc.) 
Page 5  
Figure G-1: Capabilities versus Architecture 
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Latent resilience responds to longer-term goals. Our brain’s architecture supports moving things around 
flexibly. Latent resilience enables an ability to change what one is resilient to, both in terms of sensing 
and reaction (e.g., machine learning in robots). The difference between capabilities of human pilots and 
robots, for example, is that we do things a lot better at a higher (latent) level. However, robots are ideal 
for most real-time (active) resilience in the bottom layers. Humans are not good at active resilience 
because we’re slow. In piloted vehicles, we’re heavily augmented with respect to active resilience 
because we’re so slow. But we’re extremely good at latent resilience and unable to build robots that have 
anything near our latent resilience. The handoff is not handled well. The adaptive nature of the brain is 
not easily reproduced.  
The research question turns out to be: “What’s the relation between active and latent resilience?” Active 
resilience is preprogrammed rapid responses while latent resilience is tuning these conditions as 
challenges change via learned responses. That has not been the AI picture of things, which has been not to 
think of most resilience coming from automated, fast, real-time, unconscious processes that are tuned by a 
latent resilient system. Consider the human thought process—we move from application-level thoughts 
(latent) to middleware reactions (active) using our brains. Today’s technology attempts to mimic this. 
However, we embed capability into hardware when it becomes ubiquitous or has to have high 
performance. The closer a system works at the boundary of theoretical performance, the harder it 
becomes to develop fallback strategies. There is a mechanism that does that switching between constant 
feedback (providing active resilience) and adaptability (providing latent resilience). The fundamental 
problem is this handoff mechanism at the architectural level is not well understood. 
Today, handoff between latent and active resilience is enabled by use of various architectural layers. 
Reflexive processes (in the active layers) buy time, which keeps the system going so that other latent (or 
deliberative) mechanisms can adapt. Good built-in reflexes will keep the system alive until it can figure 
out at the high levels (latent) how to adapt. Back and forth between these two layers is important. We 
often can’t build architectures that allow back and forth. Layered architectures do a very rigid thing today. 
For example, TCP/IP doesn’t allow adaptability; you would not want to have it in this situation, yet it is 
an example of a seven-layer architecture. The human brain is amazing—things can become inconsistent 
across layers within the brain but consistency is restored. At the top layers (deliberative) they start solving 
for a different goal than at the bottom layers (reflexive), but both top and bottom layers with time 
seamlessly interact to converge on uniform behavior. In today’s systems, if we build in more flexibility, 
the interfaces become more complex and might not work, but more rigid restrictions on how layers 
interact results in less likelihood of failure at the expense of less adaptability. The challenge is how to 
create the interfaces so there is flexibility of human brain–like functionality without interfaces to these 
various layers breaking.  
The point of the above discussion is that architectures are a way of providing capabilities of active versus 
latent resilience but these capabilities are essential to enable next generation architecture development. 
Latent resilience is resilience without diversity (not doing something different); active resilience is taking 
a different action. Both these forms of resilience are realized by a wide variety of low- to high-level 
capabilities. With the following discussions, we list and discuss a series of capabilities that exist today, 
which were considered by the subgroup. 
Capabilities-Enabling Latent Resilience 
Capabilities-enabling latent resilience can be divided into two classifications: structural and behavioral. 
Behavioral latent resilience capabilities include various forms of machine learning, planning, deliberative 
automated reasoning implementations, and many others. Our group did not discuss these extensively. We 
dealt more with existing capabilities that could enable structural resilience. In Section 4.3, a roadmap of 
several capabilities common to our reference missions are presented that enable behavioral latent 
resilience. Structural resilience is the notion that we can incorporate certain design structure or process 
that will enable latent resilience. 
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Currently, a safety and mission-critical development process is used for our missions (Figure G-2). When 
we use the safety-dominated approach, we assume a rigid set of behaviors for the system and all V&V 
items can be accounted for. With this rigid assumption, we are not going to be resilient to the unexpected. 
Systems with behavioral latent resilient features are not verifiable. 
Engineering Resilient
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Figure G-2: Today’s Development Process 
Currently, we are routinely researching common formal verification tools for enabling structural latent 
resilience of our systems through verification of design. Examples of popular approaches are: 
1. SPIN (Holzmann, 1997) 
a. Explicit-state model checkers 
b. Generate and explore every possible state 
2. Symbolic Model Checking (SMC) (“Model checking”, 2013) 
a. Manipulates entire sets of states at once 
b. Set consists of all states that satisfy certain logical conditions 
c. Such conditions are encoded as (ordinary) Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) and can be 
complex to code 
3. Bounded Model Checking (BMC) (“Model checking”, 2013) 
a. Use satisfiability (SAT) solvers instead of BDDs 
b. SAT solvers implement decision procedures based on propositional logic 
c. SAT solvers perform approximate verification by exploring the model only to a given depth 
4. Runtime Verification (RV) (“Runtime verification”, 2013) 
a. Is performed at run time 
b. Is a lightweight verification technique that complements traditional a priori verification 
c. Checks whether the current execution of a system satisfies or violates a given correctness 
property 
d. Uses a monitor to decide whether the execution is correct 
e. Monitors are automatically generated using a high-level specification language such as SALT 
(Structured Assertion Language for Temporal Logic) 
 71 
f. Can be used to check correctness of partially verified systems (verification based on 
assumptions about operational environment) 
Other capabilities exist in the form of formal specification languages that can be used to synthesize 
correct design models. For example, we discussed a unique tool named FORMULA 
(http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/formula) that accepts a formal constraint-based language 
and from constraint specifications generates a model that satisfies these. In addition, Richard Murray’s 
group at Caltech is actively developing mechanisms to perform both offline and online optimization and 
synthesis of system designs enabling structural resilience (Wongpiromsarn, Topcu, and Murray, 2010). 
Tools of this kind are currently research grade, but provide a basis to produce system designs with 
guaranteed analytical provable behavior.  
If more verifiable architectures are desired, the group considered the need to dial in different thinking 
about layers to ensure structural latent resilience. It was observed that human low-level (e.g., reflexive) 
behavior has not changed much. These reflexive or homeostatic mechanisms of humans do not change 
and are rigid. If we start to think about layers of capabilities within a spacecraft, we realize that various 
levels of trust will exist in every layer. The more rigid or homeostatic spacecraft behavior layers would 
have the highest degree of trust, while the higher deliberative layers would then have less trusted 
behavior. 
Implementation of the reflexive lower layer discussed above, is enabled with a large variety of 
technologies that are currently deployed but dismissed for use in deep space missions. Currently, our 
flight software systems are monolithic sets of multiple threads of sequential execution. The notion of 
encapsulating with components and abstracting away interface complexity using ports and connectors is 
currently state-of-the-art software engineering, but is not used in deep space spacecraft projects. 
Representation and synthesis of the component-port-connect code deployment model from standard 
architectural description languages (such as Unified Modeling Language [UML] (Object Management 
Group, 2011) and Architecture Analysis & Design Language [AADL] (Feiler and Gluch, 2012)) is useful 
and beginning to be used within the deep spacecraft domain. 
Current JPL-developed planetary spacecraft do not reuse many software technologies that potentially 
could be taken advantage of. Rationale for not adopting existing software capabilities is that to achieve 
the reliability required, we must design and test from scratch. The group discussed a variety of software 
technologies (some already in use aboard the International Space Station) that could potentially be 
adopted for new projects. Some of the technologies covered include: 
• Robotic Operating System (ROS) (Quigley et al., 2009) is an open source framework for rapidly 
developing and characterizing robotic systems. It is currently used in the implementation of 
Robonaut 2 aboard the ISS. ROS contains some machine vision software capabilities also, similar 
to the public domain OpenCV software for computer vision (Bradski and Kaehler, 2008). 
• Coupled-Layer Architecture for Robotic Autonomy (CLARAty) (Volpe et al., 2001)) is a 
software framework developed to integrate autonomy and control capabilities for robotics 
applications. It is open source and a collaborative university effort. Besides this particular 
framework, there are a wide variety of frameworks in existence, which we discussed briefly. 
• Use of open standards to enable reliable middleware functionality and adaption of architectural 
standards were discussed. The Object Management Group (OMG) (www.omg.org) standards 
have matured over the years and are used reliably in various domains. Of particular interest was 
the Data Distributed Services (DDS) (Object Management Group, 2007) middleware standard 
and implementations. DDS is a distributed publish-subscribe middleware system with various 
real-time guarantees built in. For example, one can dial in Quality of Service (QoS) characteristic 
requirement constraints such as required latency. DDS is used for many applications and is 
primary technology for the Human Exploration Telerobotics Project demonstration flying on the 
ISS. 
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• At JPL, within Division 34, there is considerable interest in avionics standard ARINC 653 
(ARINC, 2013). ARINC 653 is a standard for avionics real-time operating systems. The intention 
is to provide both time and space partitioning of software modules within a single CPU 
environment. Originally this standard was developed for military and commercial aircraft but JPL 
is researching use within a core FSW architecture currently in development. Space partitioning is 
simply providing isolation of memory spaces between software modules for safe operation. 
Partitioning in time restricts individual tasks to be executed within specific time slots. Use of the 
time slot–based scheduling restriction is potentially a problem for low-latency event driven 
systems. 
• AFRL Space Plug n’ Play Avionics (SPA) (Lyke, 2007) is another interesting standard that was 
developed within the AAII and is maturing. SPA hardware and software concepts that make plug-
and-play possible are: 
 Self-description: components describe themselves using eXtended Transducer Electronics 
Datasheet (xTEDS) 
 Discovery & join: automatic recognition when plugged into a system or networked 
 Satellite Data Model (SDM): software that binds together other pieces of SPA 
 Push-button tool flow: using web-based software tools to translate a user’s ideas directly into 
a buildable spacecraft (e.g., wizard-driven dialogs) 
 SPA has been implemented in a variety of system forms since 2004, ranging from coffee 
cup–sized CubeSats to 400-kg (882-lb) tactical spacecraft.  
Both Draper Labs and JPL have been funding the use of massively parallel (49- to 64-core) multicore 
processor R&D prototypes to demonstrate increased structural latent resilience capabilities. Both efforts 
use TRN algorithm deployment. Draper Labs has an advanced planetary landing system with emphasis on 
the lunar test case, whereas JPL’s TRN testbed was put in place to develop advanced autonomous landing 
techniques for future Mars missions. Both institutions have been testing algorithms on the Tilera 
architecture that comes in a 64-core commercial grade chip with migration path to a 49-core, radiation-
hardened, space-qualified chip, known as Maestro (Figure G-3) (Malone, 2009). 
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Figure G-3: Maestro 49 Core Rad-Hard Processor—an Enabling Technology 
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Multicore processors are general-purpose redundant computers. They have great potential in enabling the 
deployment of various high-level capabilities discussed later in this appendix (e.g., AI planning 
deployments, fault protection, etc.). Multicore provides the ability to place cores in various work 
configurations where they can be dynamically reconfigured. Abilities to turn cores on and off allow a 
greater fidelity to control use of power. 
The JPL Strategic R&D task, Demonstration of Multi-Core System Software for Fail-Operational Flight 
Computing, used the JPL-developed TRN algorithms to demonstrate fail operational and graceful 
degradation fault recovery scenarios. The Tilera tile-64 chip was used for the initial effort and later the 
software was executed, under radiation test conditions, on a Maestro chip. For the fail operational 
scenario with hard real-time constraints, TRN state estimation was selected for adaptation and 
demonstration. Triple modular redundancy (TRM) was used to demonstrate redundant Kalman filters 
could fail and recover in real time without estimation data being affected. To demonstrate graceful 
degradation, we have selected the TRN function for landmark image data processing and correlating it 
with stored map data for adaptation. This capability is achieved by parallelizing the image processing 
function of the TRN code using multiple Tilera processing elements (as many as 40 processing elements) 
with each executing concurrently only on a subframe of the entire image frame. In the event of a core 
failure, the remaining healthy cores for landmark processing will continue to function and a new core 
instantiated with failed cores functionality to recover full image feature detection capability. 
Draper Labs has performed similar demonstrations for JPL but has also characterized Maestro 
performance. Each Maestro core provides a 25–30% performance enhancement over RAD750 when 
operated in cache. The RAD750 is has been the JPL standard flight processor flown on missions such as 
MSL. More performance details are: 
• RAD750 provides ~80 MFLOPS when operated at 133 MHz, 11 W nominal power 
• One Maestro core provides 100 MFLOPS when operated at 260 MHz 
• Maestro provides 50x = 5 GFLOPS at 260 MHz, 20 W nominal power 
Improved performance of the Maestro and other future generations of multicore will be a significant 
enabling capability of future resilient spacecraft. 
Capabilities-Enabling Active Resilience 
As stated above, we consider active resilience to be reactive and rapidly triggered behaviors. Current 
deployment of autonomy and fault protection is therefore classified in this section as active resilience–
enabling capabilities. A brief overview of autonomy techniques currently used within flight systems was 
discussed: 
1. Automated planning 
a. Onboard commanding and resource management 
b. Automated response to faults/opportunities based on constraints and resources 
c. Examples: CASPER (Chien, Knight, Stechert, Sherwood, and Rabideau, 1999), Remote 
Agent Experiment (RAX) (Bernard et al., 1998; Muscettola, Nayak, Pell, and Williams, 
1998), RHex (Saranli, Buehler, and Koditschek, 2001) and CREST (Woods et al., 2008) 
robots, etc. 
d. Seeing significant use for AUVs/UUVs 
2. Smart executives 
a. Shorter-term onboard response 
b. Enables command conditionals, looping behavior, retries, etc. 
c. Examples: Virtual Machine Language (VML) (Grasso, 2002), Spacecraft Command 
Language (SCL) (Buckley and Vangaasbeck, 1994), Titan (Williams, Ingham, Chung, and 
Elliott, 2003), etc. 
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3. Onboard data analysis 
a. Identify new science targets or opportunities 
b. Prioritize data for downlink (getting it to ground faster) 
c. Data summary (gets summary information to ground faster) 
d. Lots of visual image analysis; some hyperspectral analysis 
e. Examples: EO-1 (Chien et al., 2005), AEGIS (Estlin et al., 2012), MER dust-devils (Castano 
et al., 2006), etc. 
f. Swift astrophysics mission (Gehrels et al., 2004): slews spacecraft when gamma-­‐ray bursts 
are detected 
4. Automated navigation 
a. Enable vehicle to avoid problems and reach goals efficiently (GESTALT (Goldberg, 
Maimone, and Matthies, 2002), DIMES (Cheng, Johnson, and Matthies, 2005), etc.) 
As part of the active resilience capabilities, the group considered fault management architectures 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2012). All current missions utilize some form of the 
typical monitors/alarms and responses architecture. Many different designs have flown but most 
implementations use the following elements: error monitors (some form of sensing off nominal 
conditions), responses (some form of automated attempt to fix a fault), and some coordination mechanism 
(commonly called a FP engine) to manage monitor output to response input mapping. 
Currently, there are three fault management architectures, which the focus group discussed: monitor-
response-inhibit (Figure G-4), goal-based execution (Figure G-5), and model-based execution 
(Figure G-6). 
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Monitor-Response-Inhibit 
•  Each monitor detects a specific anomaly 
•  Monitors are often tunable with thresholds 
such as ‘confidence’, ‘persistence’ and 
‘decay’ 
•  Thresholds are constant, not activity-specific 
•  A tripped monitor triggers a specific 
response (rule-like: “when x do y”) 
•  A response may kill a sequence and/or start 
a sequence 
•  Inhibit flag on each monitor and response 
can be set/reset by ground and by 
responses 
•  Monitors & responses typically integrated 
after nominal control system working 
•  Often called “rule-based” or “autonomy” 
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Figure G-4: Monitor-Response-Inhibit 
The monitor-response-inhibit style fault protection is the one typically used in spacecraft with the addition 
of a FP engine for the delivery of monitor status to responses. With this approach, everything must be 
enumerated as to all the functionality and possible anomalies that can happen. It is essentially asking what 
the failure modes are and if they can be reduced to a manageable set. The approach is very labor intensive 
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but for simple systems, it is very testable since all the monitors and responses are known and the 
combinations can be tested. 
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Goal-Based Execution 
•  Each goal represents … 
–  desired behavior (part of activity plan) 
–  an activity to be accomplished, or 
–  a required condition 
•  Each goal has a success criterion that is…  
–  tuned for that activity 
–  monitored for success/failure 
•  Goals may have supporting goals 
–  sub-goals that must be achieved in  
order to achieve parent goal 
•  Goal failure means that  
–  the activity is not achievable, or 
–  a required condition no longer holds 
•  Response to goal failure is one of:  
–  reconfigure in an attempt to achieve the goal 
–  escalate to parent goal 
–  shed the goal and its supporting goals (everything else keeps going) 
–  keep trying to achieve (best-effort) 
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Figure G-5: Goal-Based Execution 
The goal-based execution style of fault protection distributes the fault protection function amongst a 
network of goals. The notion of the fault protection engine and responses are replaced by a notion of goal 
networks. If a goal is constrained, either it does nothing or it is re-elaborated as other goals and this 
process continues. This style of fault protection was implemented at JPL as the Mission Data System 
(MDS) architecture (Ingham, Rasmussen, Bennett, and Moncada, 2005). It has the promise of scaling 
more effectively for larger more complex systems than the monitor-response-inhibit style; however, 
manual coding is still required to realize the functionality of the goals as tactics.  
The third style of fault protection is the model-based reasoning style shown and explained below (in 
Figure G-6). This style of fault protection was implemented at MIT in the Titan architecture (Williams, 
Ingham, Chung, and Elliott, 2003). It is easy to conceptualize this approach, but implementing the models 
to realize a fully reliable system can be challenging. 
In general, these methods of fault protection are nonscaling. The problem is when you have hundreds of 
monitors and related actions you never know what will happen if things interfere, etc. A persistent 
question is: “How do you validate it?” Some of the problems might improve by considering hybrid 
system architecture approaches. This proposes taxonomy in these three architectural styles. Potentially, 
we could start thinking about these styles as dimensions or layers. At the lower layers is one style, at the 
top layer another, etc. We should not presume in general that a given style is good for all layers. But 
again, the interplay between the layers is a good research question. 
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Model-Based Execution 
•  The “system model” is a connected 
set of component models, each one 
describing component behavior for 
nominal and fault modes 
•  The deductive mode estimator 
compares observations to model-
predicted state. If they are 
inconsistent …  
–  It deduces the most probable fault mode, 
or 
–  It concludes “unknown system state” 
•  The reactive planner searches for 
alternate ways to achieve the goals 
•  There is very little fault protection 
code, per se, because fault detection, 
diagnosis and response result from 
reasoning over the system model 
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Figure G-6: Model-Based Execution 
Autonomy and Planners 
The notions of active resilient and behavioral latent resilient capabilities blur when we start to consider 
autonomy. State machines are currently the most common mechanism used for autonomous behavior. The 
decision to go to safe mode is a reactive thing done based on system state, which enables active resilience 
and is usually implemented via a state machine. In more sophisticated systems, automated planners often 
sit at the top and have a global system perspective. At the next level down, another autonomy system 
serves as a smart executive, which is not looking as far. It has a shorter time window so its ability to 
reason about long-term plan objectives is limited, but it can do reasoning above executing set of 
commands—we consider it enabling active resilience. Planners are responsible for generation of longer 
time window plans, but may or may not be deliberative in their operation, so for our discussion we still 
consider them enhancing the active resilience of the system. 
As part of the Capabilities Focus Group’s work, we generated a brief history of autonomy to example 
how this capability evolved. The history of autonomy is summarized in the following list: 
1. Before the 90s: 
a. Attempt to replicate human reasoning 
b. Operators generated desired sequences manually 
2. From the 90s: 
a. UML simple state-machines (Harel, 1987) 
b. Desire scheduling with resource allocations (comes along Automated Scheduling and 
Planning Environment (ASPEN) (Rabideau, Knight, Chien, Fukunaga, and Govindjee, 1999), 
CASPER, or EUROPA (Frank, Jónsson, Morris, and Smith, 2001) planners) 
i) ASPEN and CASPER use a temporal constraint language to compute an optimized set of 
actions based on the constraints given. It is essentially an iterative tree search solution. 
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CASPER is designed for embedded online applications whereas ASPEN is designed for 
offline use. 
c. FDIR 
i) Execution monitoring for off-nominal conditions 
ii) Isolate and identify failures 
iii) Fault responses (safing, fail-operational) 
iv) Desire to generate command sequences from models automatically 
v) 1999 demonstrated on DS-1 with spacecraft fault protection based on automatic code-
generation techniques (Rouquette, Neilson, and Chen, 1999) 
vi) Remote Agent Livingstone mode identification and reconfiguration (Williams and 
Nayak, 1996) 
3. From 1995 to present: 
a. Better models and not hand coded 
b. Planning to enable low-level hardware configuration 
c. i.e., CASPER doing ‘activity planning’—classical planners 
d. Actions and goals with constraints; too hard for 1990s planners, now achievable 
e. Good success in automated navigation for spacecraft 
4. Example technologies from MIT group (Williams et al.) 
a. Burton, “A Reactive Planner for a Model based Executive” (Williams and Nayak, 1997) 
i) Developed for DS-1 
ii) Reactive (online) planner 
b. Burton (Wang and Williams, 2014) 
i) Fast offline planner 
ii) Algorithm decomposes problem and dependencies flow one way in an order 
iii) Developing piece actions for large state spaces: goals to achieve task 
iv) Goals changing over time; actions are temporal and constrained 
A survey of AI planners developed outside of MIT, which is by no means all inclusive, resulted in this 
list: 
1. UCPOP (Penberthy and Weld, 1992) 
2. GraphPlan (Blum and Furst, 1997) 
3. BlackBox (Kautz and Selman, 1999) 
4. Fast Forward Planner (Hoffmann, 2001) 
5. Fast Downward (Helmert, 2006) 
6. CRIKEY/COLIN/OPTIC (Coles, Fox, Halsey, Long, and Smith, 2009; Coles, Coles, Fox and 
Long, 2012; Benton, Coles and Coles, 2012) 
7. LPRPG/LPG (Coles, Coles, Fox and Long, 2011) 
8. SGPlan (Hsu, Wah, Huang, and Chen, 2006) 
Redundancy 
The topic of redundancy was considered by Erv Baumann of Northrup Grumman, and the group 
considered some capability examples. The following traditional and additional levels of redundancy are 
proposed for long-duration space missions involving multiple identical (or sufficiently similar) spacecraft 
(with new additional levels indicated in bold italic): 
1. Collective (e.g., multiple aircraft or spacecraft in collaborative formation flight) 
2. System level 
3. Subsystem level 
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4. Unit/box level (called “Line Replaceable Units” by Air Force, “Weapons Replaceable Units” by 
Navy, and “Orbital Replacement Units” by NASA) 
5. Board or component level (inside the boxes, some people combine this with level 4) 
6. Subcomponent level (e.g., multicore or other highly replicated chip-level hardware) 
7. Lower tessellated/fractalized levels (at or below multicore level, including the ultimate 
evolution through microbots and nanobots to programmable matter) 
The idea of collective redundancy is best described by several examples. Consider the example of 
multilevel FDIR response to degraded flight control actuation system (Figure G-7). The scenario is as 
follows: 
1. Flight group embarks on mission with all systems functional and all aircraft in flight group 
periodically exchanging health & status (H&S) information (Figure G-7 [top]). 
2. Nearing the target area, one of the key aircraft in the flight group experiences degradation or loss 
of EMA control authority resulting in severely reduced flight-control performance and 
vulnerability to attack. Propulsion, sensor, and weapons systems are fully functional. 
3. Control system reconfigures to maintain controllability and ‘baby the aircraft’ to 
manage/maximize remaining useful life (RUL) (Figure G-7 [bottom]). 
4. Due to the critical nature of the damaged aircraft’s payload (primary ordnance and/or sensors 
required to destroy this high-priority ‘target of opportunity’) and time-critical nature of the 
mission, the flight group’s mission management software decides to press on while automatically 
reconfiguring its aircraft flying formation and tactics by moving the degraded aircraft to the 
inside of the formation where it will be less vulnerable. 
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Figure G-7: (top) Nominal flight formation; (bottom) flight formation after reconfiguration 
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Erv Baumann uses the term collective redundancy to describe the idea that if you have multiple copies of 
physically separate units (e.g., a number of formation-flying UAVs or CubeSats), you can leverage that 
level of redundancy in a number of ways including the reconfiguration of flight group just discussed or 
the cannibalization example considered next. 
In 2007, DARPA launched the Orbital Express mission to demonstrate autonomous on-orbit spacecraft 
repair (Figure G-8) (Whelan, Adler, Wilson, and Roesler, 2000). Several demonstrations were conducted 
between the two satellites. The ASTRO servicing satellite successfully replaced both the battery and 
flight computer in the NEXTSat prototype serviceable satellite. This illustrates the idea of collective 
redundancy and cannibalization of one spacecraft to repair another. 
 
Figure G-8: DARPA Orbital Express Mission On-Orbit Autonomous Repair 
These two examples are special cases of what is considered to be ‘outside the skin’ (of the aircraft or 
spacecraft) redundancy. It generalizes the concept of redundancy to include any resources that are within 
reach via some conveyance or transport mechanism (e.g., a spacecraft flying over to a disabled spacecraft 
like Orbital Express or a lunar rover with a critical component being commanded to drive to a disabled 
lunar base so it can be cannibalized to save lives, etc.). This type of redundancy we have called collective 
redundancy. 
Summary 
Currently, we build resilience directly into our flight software by using conventional techniques such as 
exceptions, timeouts, and other low-level programming mechanisms to intercept errors caused by either 
system design flaws or changes in environmental conditions that our system was not suitably designed to 
tolerate. Unfortunately, this approach is not good for handling changing objectives and tracing to the root 
cause of a problem, and makes it hard to retrofit a legacy system since many of these techniques are 
pervasive and obfuscate the true intended functionality. The other method commonly used today to ensure 
resilience is human oversight. Operators, system engineers, and scientists, etc. will keep global oversight 
and provide intelligent responses to assure safe operation. Unfortunately, this approach is costly, can be 
error-prone, and often does not scale well. Even worse, in deep space scenarios, timely human interaction 
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Orbit Express was a 
demonstration of  autonomous 
satellite servicing in orbit 
•  Launched March 8, 2007 
•  Managed by: DARPA and NASA 
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Orbital Express Mission: 
•  Two spacecraft: 
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•  Battery and Flight Computer 
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can be problematic. An increasingly interesting approach to making a flight system more resilient is 
providing the capability for its flight software to self-adapt at run time to handle such things as system 
resource variability, environmental changes forcing nominal system functionality to change, and system 
faults.  
The topic of self-adaptive software systems has been studied in a variety of application areas, including 
autonomic computing, robotics, control systems, programming languages, software architectures, fault-
tolerant computing, and biological computing, but not yet in the planetary spacecraft domain. The 
capabilities subgroup realized this but did not have expertise in this area to perform a detailed study. We, 
however, considered three research self-adaptive software systems approaches that are promising for the 
realization of resilient systems. Rainbow is a self-adaptive software system from Carnegie Mellon 
University (CMU) that uses an abstract architectural model to monitor an executing system’s run-time 
properties. A language called Stitch is used to configure Rainbow and provides a way to express 
constraints and strategies for adapting the run-time system to prevent violations of the constraints with 
respect to the model. It performs various levels of adaptations on the running systems. A nice discussion 
of Rainbow is presented in Garlan, Cheng, Huang, Schmerl, and Steenkiste (2004)..  
During Workshop #1, several suggestions implied looking at bio-inspired software systems as a good way 
to provide resilience. Two interesting self-adaptive demonstrations from Michigan State University were 
discovered. An approach using digital evolution (leveraging the AVIDA digital evolution platform (Ofria 
and Wilke, 2004)) for evolving population of digital organisms (synthesized UML state behaviors as a set 
of interacting objects) subject to natural selection, where organisms are rewarded for generating state 
diagrams that support key scenarios and satisfy critical properties as specified by the developer. The SPIN 
model checker (Holzmann, 1997) and other tools were used to evaluate the state behaviors correctness or 
merit for the natural selection. The approach was successfully demonstrated to control autonomous 
navigation of a robot within a changing environment. A complete description is presented in Goldsby, 
Cheng, McKinley, Knoester, and Ofria (2008). The other interesting notion was that of an emulated 
digital enzyme as a communication mechanism—connecting parallelized reactive robotic control agents 
was demonstrated to explore the potential for evolving simulated controllers for the foraging problem. 
Properties of each robot and stimuli present in the environment are encoded in a digital format (molecule) 
capable of being manipulated and altered through programs (enzymes) executing in parallel inside each 
controller to produce the robot’s foraging behavior. Evaluation of this design evolved strategies 
demonstrating various nature behaviors including the concept of using a primitive language for 
communications. The discussion of the project is presented in Byers, Cheng, and McKinley (2011). Both 
these methods leverage on having massively redundant and flexible elements at their core. 
We considered redundancy in a different way than it is currently used within spacecraft today—the so-
called ‘outside the skin’ scenarios discussed above. We deploy static or dynamic redundancy routinely 
today where subsystems within spacecraft are replicated. The distinction between static and dynamic 
redundancy is somewhat fuzzy, however, whatever term is used, redundancy of subsystems today is 
limited to a small number (such as 2 to 5) identical or similar units. To utilize redundancy today, some 
sort of logical switching criteria or continuous Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) voting scheme is used. 
We speculated that resilient systems of the future require a new type of redundancy called collective 
redundancy where: (1) systolic arrays of interacting spacecraft (either connected or in formation flight) 
are capable of morphing configuration to preserve an acceptable level of functionality, (2) spacecraft are 
capable of cannibalization of units to effect repair, replacing degraded or nonfunctional units from one 
spacecraft with units from another spacecraft autonomously. The kind of redundancy needed for 
resilience is not yet realized. 
We can gain additional effective redundancy by developing designs in which components are repurposed. 
For instance, science instruments/sensors might be pressed into service for health monitoring. Think, for 
example, of how valuable it might have been and how much time might have been saved if the Galileo 
imaging system could have turned and taken a look directly at the partially deployed antenna, versus 
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having to deduce its configuration from other data. This capability of reconfiguration to repurpose 
components is a promising enabler of graceful degradation potentially preserving nominal functionality. 
For example, imagine the real-life DS-1 scenario of a star tracker failing and repurposing a high-
resolution science imager in use as a replacement star tracker (Rayman and Varghese, 2001). 
We conclude the Capability Focus Group study by realizing that reliability, redundancy, reconfigurability, 
and recovery are the four elements necessary for resilience capabilities. Multicore processor devices are 
redundant and configurable; reliability and recovery within these devices is currently being demonstrated. 
Fail-operational modes have been demonstrated successfully in commercial-grade multicore processors. 
Software is reliable if built using strict constraints, however, architectural problems exist in sophisticated 
autonomy and adaptive software systems to assure safety-critical, high-reliability operation. Process does 
not scale well yet for systems or software. Autonomy and fault protection architectures are evolving in 
other domains (e.g., military aviation and space commercial applications) faster than NASA planetary or 
deep space missions.  
The Capabilities Focus Group basically gathered information on a wide variety of technical capabilities, 
such as fault detection/management architectures, autonomy (planners), standards for software process, 
architecture and middleware, etc. A high-level survey of autonomy history and AI planners was captured 
and discussed. A list of these capabilities was generated and presented at Workshop #2, with the goal of 
integrating and generating more general capabilities that would meet common reference mission 
requirements presented in Workshop #2. The Section 4.3 Roadmap for Technical Development presents 
the ultimate outcome of this exercise as applied to commonalities of our three reference missions. 
